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This dissertation examines if and how technological innovation influences market 
structure of the media industry.  The empirical focus is twofold: 1) to measure and quantify the 
level of ownership concentration and competition (i.e., market structure) of the U.S. media 
industry, and 2) to examine the market structure of the media industry as a function of the 
adoption of three different media technologies, including television, cable television, and the 
Internet. OLS regression analysis is employed to address the following research question: How 
do technological innovations affect the market structure of the media industry? 
Results of the study provide support for the idea that changes in the adoption rates of 
television and cable television lead to changes in the market structure of the media industry.  The 
study, however, identifies challenges associated with collecting sufficient data to reach solid 
conclusions.  Finally, the study makes recommendations for future studies that could overcome 








Comcast’s acquisition of NBC in 2011 represented a significant change in the American 
media industry. For the first time in the history of the U.S. media, one of the major broadcast 
networks in the United States would be owned by one of the largest cable system operators.  As 
with other large media mergers in the past, the acquisition generated protests and concerns of an 
increasing consolidation of power among fewer and fewer media conglomerates (Crawford, 
2010).  Comparing the acquisition to the AOL—Time Warner merger and other media mega-
mergers, Free Press attorney Corie Wright predicted, “This merger goes deeper and wider than 
any of those” (Reybern, 2010).  Conversely, proponents such as NBC Chief Executive Jeff 
Zucker extolled the virtues of the merger, predicting, “Consumers of all our products—on 
screens large and small—will have the benefit of enhanced content and experiences, delivered in 
new and better ways” (Finke, 2009). 
The arguments leading up to the merger’s eventual FCC approval rekindled an ongoing 
discussion regarding media ownership that has endured since the fierce debates of the 1920s 
regarding the role and nature of radio broadcasting (McChesney, Telecommunications, mass 
media, and democracy: The battle for the control of U.S. broadcasting, 1928-1935, 1993) 
(McChesney, 1993).  At the heart of this debate is the importance of a free press to a healthy 
deliberative democracy (Nichols & McChesney, 2009).  Critics of media consolidation point to 
the unique role the media plays as an intermediary of diverse ideas and viewpoints, and as a 
crucial watchdog of government (Nichols & McChesney, 2009). A central concern in this debate 
is the question of whether a highly concentrated media industry is too powerful and not reflective 
of (or receptive to) the needs and demands of the general public, instead responding to demands 
of the power elites of business, government, and society (Baker, 2007). 
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Not all decry the evils of such consolidation (Steiner, 1952; Einstein, 2004).  Supporters 
of such mergers cite the value of free speech and of a free market unencumbered from 
government intervention (Fishman, 2004). Some argue that some consolidation offers media 
companies efficiencies that allow them to offer more diverse content that is not always designed 
to appeal to mainstream tastes and segments (Steiner, 1952).  Moreover, others argue that—even 
with current mergers and acquisitions within the industry—the media industry is a highly 
competitive and unconcentrated industry (Compaine & Gomery, 2000).  
Despite the lack of consensus among some scholars on the desirability of ownership 
diversity, it is nonetheless a key concern of federal communications policy.   As such, 
policymakers are often concerned with whether and how regulatory policy should be crafted to 
meet the goals and objectives of media diversity, and ownership diversity in particular. Inherent 
in these decisions is the philosophy that specific limitations or restrictions on ownership of media 
properties will lead to the type of competition and diversity of ideas, content, and viewpoints that 
is desired of a media industry servicing the populous of a democratic society. 
However, scholars have highlighted several attempts at regulating media ownership 
that—despite good intentions and sound reasoning—proved to be problematic at best and 
counterproductive at worst. Such failed attempts include the Financial Syndication and Interest 
Rules (Einstein, 2004), the Newspaper-Broadcasting Cross Ownership Rules (Gomery, 2002), 
and the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 (Martin, 2008).   
Given these well-intended but unsuccessful attempts at directly regulating media 
ownership, and inasmuch as the media industry does not operate within a vacuum fully and 
solely influenced by regulatory action, is it possible that other influences help shape the 
competitive landscape of the media industry?  If so, identifying these influences—and 
understanding how they affect the market structure of the media industry—is crucial to gaining a 
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better understanding of the dynamics of media ownership.  Such an understanding may help to 
project any changes in the market structure of the media industry resultant from changes in any 
of these influences.  Moreover, these influences could prove to be more relevant in influencing 
the media industry’s market structure, and therefore more potent in creating the kind of 
competitive landscape that is desired for a democratic society. 
As this dissertation will show, numerous researchers have argued that technological 
innovations can lead to changes in the market structure of an industry relying on or adopting 
such innovations (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Dowd, 2004; Blair, 1972).  Given the significant 
amount of literature supporting this idea, it is appropriate to extend this research by considering 
if and how such innovations might specifically influence the market structure of the media 
industry.  
This dissertation advances the debate on ownership concentration within the media 
industry (i.e., market structure) by considering the following research question: How do 
technological innovations affect the market structure of the media industry? 
This project adds to the existing body of research on the relationship between innovation 
and the media market structure in two important ways.  First, this study considers the media 
industry as whole, rather than examining one particular segment.  This approach acknowledges 
the importance of convergence within the industry, which continues to break down barriers 
between specific media, and now can make a particular medium a practical substitute for another 
medium, which previously had not been practical.   
Second, this study examines the adoption of specific innovations—television, cable 
television, and the Internet—over different periods of time, in order to benefit from a 
longitudinal approach as well as to consider the specific adoption trends of each particular 
innovation.  The different periods of time reflect the different adoption patterns for each of these 
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three innovations. Since the adoption pattern of one innovation will likely differ from that of 
another, it is important to be able to capture, measure, and consider these distinctions in order to 
gain a better understanding of how, when, and why innovations may influence market structure 
of the media industry. 
Building upon previous theory, this study considers how innovation influences market 
structure of the media industry.  In doing so, the study first measures the industry’s market 
structure (i.e., ownership concentration) in order to more accurately determine if (and to what 
degree) competition within the industry is diminishing.  Having established any trend or trends 
inherent in the evolution of the market structure of the media industry, this study then looks at 
key technological innovations in order to determine if and how these specific innovations 
impacted the evolution of the media industry’s market structure. 
The study begins by identifying and defining key terms and concepts which will be used 
throughout this dissertation.  Section A presents and defines these key terms.  Specifically, 
definitions for these terms are provided within the context of how they are used for this study.  
These terms may be defined differently in various other studies or in different contexts.  It is 
therefore important to clearly distinguish how such terms are used precisely in this study.  
 Finally, Section B explains the importance and the impact that this study can and should 
have, and the anticipated contribution such a study will make to the existing body of research 
and literature.  As will be discussed in Section B, this contribution will be to advance an 
understanding with respect to the relationship between innovation and market structure in 
general, and between innovation and media market structure in particular.  
A. Defining Key Terms 
Included in the above-description of this project are several key terms that have also been 
featured frequently and prominently throughout previous literature; however, definitions of these 
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vary from one researcher to another.  As such, it is important to review and clearly define these 
terms within the context of this study.   
1. Market Structure.  For this study, “market structure” reflects the level of competition 
within the industry, and takes into account both the number of firms and the distribution of 
revenues among these firms. This is consistent with the approach taken by researchers such as 
Albarran and Dimmick (1996) and Compaine and Gomery (2000).   
Market structures can be defined based on the number of firms within the particular 
industry, the product offered by firms within the industry, or a combination of both 
(Chacholiades, 1986). Media economists, for example, have measured competition (or “market 
structure”) of specific segments (e.g., product offerings) within the U.S. media industry such as 
television (Howard, 1998), radio (Drushel, 1998), film (Gomery, 1984), and book publishing 
(Greco, 2000).  Alternatively, Alexander (1994) assessed the market structure of the music 
recording industry by also considering the number of firms competing against each other.  
Microeconomists generally assess a market’s structure within the context of the level of 
competition for that market (Baird, 1975).  In these cases, market structures are classified within 
the spectrum of “perfect competition” and “monopoly” (p. 100).  Market structures often reflect 
the competitive level of the firms within the industry as well, typically measured by considering 
each company’s market share—based on its revenues—within the industry being studied 
(Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Compaine and Gomery, 2000).   
Other researchers have relied on different taxonomies of “market structure” in order to 
answer specific research questions.  Emmons and Prager (1997), for example, in studying the 
cable television industry, defined market structures based on ownership (private vs. non-private, 
or governmental).  Similarly, Dunaway (2008), when considering influences on the quality of 
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campaign new coverage, examined differences between corporate owned and privately held 
media firms.  
In this study, a highly concentrated market structure indicates a media industry that 
features few companies with large market shares exerting great influence over all competitors in 
the industry.  Conversely, a highly competitive market structure indicates many companies 
aggressively competing for customers and revenues without any company enjoying a significant 
level of market power, as measured by the company’s market share of the industry.  This study 
may discuss the market structure of the media industry relative to “media concentration” or 
“ownership concentration” as well.  As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two 
through Five, these terms have been used by different researchers in different ways.  Unless 
otherwise stated, the terms “media concentration” and “ownership concentration” in this study 
will relate to the market structure of the industry, as defined in this section. 
 2. Innovation. The review of previous studies in Chapter Two offers a deeper 
explanation of the different approaches that researchers have taken in defining and 
operationalizing the concept of “innovation” when seeking to establish a relationship between 
innovation and market structure.  One approach has been to examine a specific technological 
innovation in order to see if and how it affected the structure of a particular market or industry 
(Alexander, 1994; Hannan & McDowell, 1990).  Abernathy and Utterback (1978) argue that 
innovations can be both radical and incremental.  Radical innovations generally impact the 
production process of cost structure within an industry, and often lead to new industries.  This 
study will follow this approach and specifically will examine radical innovations that 
significantly changed the media industry.  Three innovations—television, cable television, and 
the Internet—will each be studied because each has been viewed as a new medium of mass 
communication (Hilliard & Keith, 2010; James, 1983; Morris & Morgan, 2002).  
7 
 
 3. Media Industry.  For the purpose of this study, “the media industry” will be defined 
to include any company in the business of creating, distributing, or owning news, entertainment, 
or informational content for consumption by mass audiences.  This definition closely mirrors that 
used by Compaine and Gomery (2000).  However, those researchers also included 
telecommunications companies engaged in what has traditionally been viewed as interpersonal 
(i.e., one-to-one) communications such as local and long distance telephone service providers.  
This study does not consider such services to be mass communication, and will, therefore not be 
included as part of the media industry.   
Likewise, the definition used in this study is similar to how Albarran and Dimmick 
(1996) defined the media industry.  In their study, the research team included fourteen different 
sectors as classified by Veronis, Suhler and Associates in their annual Communications Industry 
Report.  Their approach, however, includes sectors such as advertising agencies and some 
miscellaneous communications services such as specialty marketing services that would not 
necessarily be consistent with this study’s definition of media industry.  Such firms are not 
included in this study when considering the media industry. 
 The media industry examined in this study is used to describe media operations 
specifically within the United States.  This may include companies headquartered outside of the 
United States; in such a case only revenues recognized as being generated in the United States 
will be included when determining the size of the media industry and appropriate market shares.  
Likewise, revenues generated by foreign operations of U.S.-based companies will not be 
considered in this study. 
B. Impact of This Study 
This study is important because the findings it generates can provide value in several 
areas.  First, academic researchers have examined the relationship between innovation and 
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market share within the context of other industries (Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Hannan & 
McDowell, 1990; Mansfield, 1983). This study extends the existing body of research to include a 
specific study of the U.S. media industry as a whole.  To be sure, some researchers have 
examined the effect of innovation on market structure of the media, but these studies have 
focused on a particular segment of the media industry (Alexander, 1994; Dowd, 2004; Peterson 
& Berger, 1975).  As horizontal integration becomes more prevalent within the media industry, 
and media conglomerates respond to convergence trends within the industry, the need to examine 
the market structure of the media industry as a whole instead of by individual segment becomes 
more relevant (Compaine & Gomery, 2000).  As such, the need arises to also consider the effect 
of innovation on the media industry as a whole.  
Secondly, while some studies have examined specific innovations, none have considered 
the adoption rate of these innovations when attempting to determine the effect of such an 
innovation on market structure, even though the adoption of such an innovation is obviously 
required for it to have an effect on market structure (Silverberg, Dosi, & Orsenigo; 1988).  
Researchers may identify an effect that innovation has on an industry’s market structure, but 
cannot fully and accurately explain or quantify the nature of this cause-and-effect relationship, 
since the adoption pattern of the innovation isn’t considered.  
Researchers have found a frequent pattern in the adoption of a new innovation, whether it 
be information, knowledge, or a physical product (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943). 
Frequently, a new innovation is adopted by a small group of “early adopters,” followed by rapid 
adoption by a larger segment of the population, with subsequent slower adoption and, finally, a 
“negative growth” phase, where individuals begin to replace the innovation with a newer idea or 
product (Levitt, 1965).  This pattern is often referred to and depicted as an “adoption curve,” 
reflecting the S-shaped trend of the adoption rates when graphically presented (Silverberg, Dosi, 
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& Orsenigo, 1988). To effectively measure whether and how a specific innovation affects market 
structure, a longitudinal approach should be considered to effectively capture the adoption 
pattern of the innovation, as measured over the time of that innovation’s adoption.  Dowd (2004) 
utilized a time series approach to measure the effect of specific innovations on the music 
industry, but the study was more focused on the number of performing acts and the number of 
recording firms, rather than on the market structure, which considers market strength of each 
firm. 
Lastly, this study is also important because of the impact such findings could have on 
policymaking endeavors. If, for example, innovation is found to have a causal effect on the 
market structure of the media, one of the outcomes of this study will be to identify, measure and 
explain this causal relationship.  In so doing, the influence of innovation on the market structure 
of the media should be considered when formulating any future policy related to media 
ownership in order to ensure the greatest possibility for effective regulation that achieves its 
desired objective without generating unanticipated consequences as well.   
On the other hand, if this study concludes that there is no causal relationship between 
innovation and media market structure, it will show a contradiction to much of the previous 
economic literature arguing such a relationship (Blair, 1972; Klepper & Graddy, 1990).  Future 
studies would be warranted in order to better understand why the innovation-to-market-structure 
relationship is evident in some industries but not the media industry.  If, indeed, this study shows 
no causal relationship between innovation and market structure, then future studies should focus 
on better understanding and identifying those variables that actually do influence the market 
structure of the media industry. 
 This study, then, uses a measurement of ownership concentration to quantify the market 
structure of the media industry.  Doing so will reveal any trends towards increased competition 
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(or, conversely, increased concentration) over the timeframe of the study—1950-2009.  Finally, 
this study measures the adoption rates of three specific mass communication technologies—
television, cable television, and the Internet—and looks for the presence of causal relationships 
between the adoption of these three new technologies and the market structure of the media 
industry.  In so doing, this study seeks to develop a model that can serve as the basis of future 
studies that are designed to further explain how innovation as well as other influences may 







 Scholars seeking to explain the nature of the relationship between innovation and market 
structure have taken varied approaches (Alexander, 1994; Blair, 1972; Dowd, 2004; Geroski & 
Pomroy, 1990; Mansfield, 1983; Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1950).  In fact, there is not a 
generally accepted principle as to which (if either) influences the other: Some argue that 
technological innovations act as catalysts or shocks to an industry, resulting in a shake-up that 
affects the market structure (Alexander, 1994; Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Klepper & Graddy, 
1990); others argue that market structure and firm size within a market stimulate innovative 
activity and ultimately technological innovation (Aghion & Griffith, 2005; Dowd, 2004; 
Schumpeter, 1950; Van Cayseele, 1998).  Both of these approaches are examined in Sections A 
and B of this chapter.   
For many theorists espousing the idea presented in Section A that innovation influences 
market structure, the diffusion of these influences is an important element in understanding how 
market structure is affected.  Section C reviews previous studies that have attempted to identify 
and measure such a relationship specifically within the media industry (Audretsch, 1995; 
Mansfield, 1983; Peterson & Berger, 1975).   
A. The Effect of Innovation on Market Structure  
Innovation is one of many exogenous influences that affect market structure (Klepper & 
Graddy, 1990). Tushman and Anderson see such innovations as “technological 
discontinuities”—significant breakthroughs or shocks to an otherwise gradual evolution of 
innovation that “either enhance or destroy the competence of firms in an industry” (p. 439, 
1986). While the introduction of any innovation may be viewed as a one-time shock to an 
industry, some researchers view the effects of the innovation as a longitudinal process with its 
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own evolutionary characteristics (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
1971; Schumpeter, 1950).  In many instances, such an evolutionary process takes on the 
characteristics of an S-shaped diffusion curve (Silverberg, Dosi, & Orsenigo; 1988). The 
diffusion curve illustrates the rate at which an idea or innovation is accepted by a particular 
population.  As Pemberton (1937) explained, “The distribution of a population according to time 
of adoption . . . tends to follow the normal frequency form and the curve of diffusion is the 
cumulative expression of this distribution” (p. 55).    
The theoretical explanation to adoption patterns described by Rogers (1962) is prevalent 
in much of the literature supporting the idea that the adoption, not just the introduction, of an 
innovation is an important factor in measuring its effect on market structure (Silverberg, et al., 
1988).  The idea of an S-shaped pattern of diffusion is also used to explain how industries and 
individual products can evolve over time. In such cases, the “Industry life cycle” or “Product life 
cycle” reflects differing rates of adoption over time (Klepper, 1996; Mazzucato, 2000).  Both 
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations theory and the Industry Life Cycle theory will be discussed in 
greater detail.  
Whether an adoption pattern follows the traditional diffusion curve pattern or one unique 
to a particular innovation, such concepts are used to help explain how and why certain industries 
develop in response to technological changes.  Berger (2003) has shown that in the banking 
industry larger banks tend to implement new technologies sooner than smaller banks, while 
Dowd (2004) has shown that production technologies have helped create a more open, 
decentralized recording market with multiple, competing production companies, even though 
many of these companies are merely divisions of the same conglomerate holding company.  
In Economic Concentration, Blair (1972) examined causes and effects of market 
concentration from an empirical perspective, synthesizing years of prior research from academic 
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as well as governmental initiatives.1  As part of this examination, he considered the effect of 
innovation on market structure, and found a concentrating effect until the early 20th century.  
During this time, technological innovation generally resulted in advances that encouraged 
economies of scale, but also required significant investment to take advantage of these advances.  
As a result, companies were driven to follow a bigger-is-better strategy; industries consolidated 
either through mergers, attrition of smaller, weaker competitors, or a combination of both.   
By the late 20th century, however, Blair observed that new technological advances tended 
to be less costly, either in terms of the initial investment or in terms of the economies of scale 
required to justify such investments.  Some researchers refer to the Blair hypothesis as the idea 
that—at least since World War II—new technology and innovation has had a decentralizing 
effect on market structure (Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Mansfield, 1983).  
Mansfield (1983) examined the chemical, petroleum, and steel industries to see what kind 
of effect innovations from 1920-1982 had on these industries.  Mansfield found that in many 
cases an industry became more concentrated after the introduction of new technology, but that 
the presence of such concentration “depends on the nature and sources of the new technology” 
(p. 209).  Mansfield acknowledged that one limitation to existing models of innovation and 
market structure is the assumption that no new firms enter an industry during the introduction 
and diffusion of a technological change.  Noting that such new-firm entry had occurred in the 
drug and chemical industries, Mansfield speculated that—in such cases—innovation may 
generate greater competition and actually reduce market concentration, not increase it. 
 Geroski and Pomroy (1990) used data from two cross-sectional panels to measure the 
effect of innovations on the market structure of 73 different “technologically progressive 
                                                          
1 Blair’s work was primarily based on 44 volumes of transcripts of selected hearings before and reports of the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee during the years 1957—1971. 
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industries” in the United Kingdom (p. 305). The researchers’ findings were supportive of the 
Blair hypothesis:  Regression results showed innovation generated a negative effect on industry 
concentration, although the effect size was small.  In other words, innovation led to reduced 
industry concentration, or, conversely, increased competition. The researchers also found that 
industry deconcentration was generally felt relatively quickly after the introduction of the 
innovation. Moreover, for the industries studied, the decrease in market concentration was offset 
by increases in the industry size and in capital intensity.   
Given the substantial body of work supporting the effect of market structure on 
innovation and, conversely, of innovation on market structure, how can these two seemingly 
contradictory theoretical approaches be reconciled?  Geroski and Pomroy (1990) argue that 
different findings are not contradictory, but rather complementary, positing that such different 
findings “point to a mutually reinforcing process in which innovations deconcentrate markets, 
and such deconcentration further stimulates innovative activity (ceteris paribus)” (p.312).  Either 
aspect of this process deserves close examination: Mansfield (1983) as well as Geroski and 
Pomroy (1990) show that either aspect of the process can be studied independent of the other. 
This study, therefore, focuses on the idea that innovation influences market structure, while 
recognizing that the resulting market structure can subsequently influence further innovation.   
B. The Effect of Market Structure on Innovation 
 In examining market structure as an influencing variable on innovation and innovative 
activity, many scholars argue that differences between individual firms within a market can 
influence the respective level of innovative activity that each undertakes (Griliches, 1957; 
Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943).  Firms may be spurred to greater innovative activity by the 
potential for additional profitability or by the threat of losses due to a competitor’s innovative 
activity. On the other hand, while other firms—currently enjoying a dominant position within the 
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market—may be discouraged from innovative activity if such activity may result in new products 
that take away from their existing mix of profit-generating products and offerings (Kamien & 
Schwartz, 1969; Van Cayseele, 1998).  Such approaches, however, view a firm’s investments in 
research and development as a measurement of innovation.  This can be problematic because 
investments do not always translate to innovation; investing in innovation (i.e., research and 
development) entails a risk that those investments may result in no meaningful innovations 
(Smith & Hall, 2012). 
 Others have considered the relative size of an individual firm as a major determinant of 
innovation.  Some theorists argue that larger firms are more able and willing to generate 
innovation (Schumpeter J. , 1950), while others believe that larger firms dominating a particular 
market will have little or no incentive to engage in meaningful innovative activity (Dowd, 2004).  
In an attempt to reconcile these two schools of thought, Achs and Audretsch rely on a “modified 
Schumpeterian hypothesis that the relative innovative advantage of large and small firms is 
determined by the extent to which a market is characterized by imperfect competition” (p. 573, 
1987).  In this case large firms operating within markets having significant barriers to entry 
would be more willing and able to innovate.  Conversely, small firms would be more motivated 
to innovate in more competitive markets with lowers barriers to entry.  Others argue that smaller 
firms also have an advantage to innovate when such innovations offer significant breakthroughs, 
as opposed to those more incremental in nature (Mazzucato, 2000).   
C. Examining Innovation’s Effect on Market Structure within the Media Industry  
While prior studies examining the relationship between innovation and market structure 
in general may provide some insight into the effect of innovation on the market structure of the 
media industry, many researchers acknowledge that such a relationship varies significantly from 
one industry to another (Audretsch, 1995; Mansfield, 1983).  As such, it is important to consider 
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existing research that has examined the effect of innovation specifically on the market structure 
of the media industry.   
The relative concentration of the media industry is important for reasons.  To be sure, the 
media industry—like any other industry—should be characterized by a healthy level of 
competition, offering consumers a diversity of choices differentiated by pricing and product 
offerings.  However, the media industry is unique because of its importance to providing a 
democratic society with information and a variety of perspectives to as many people as possible 
(Fishman, 2004).  While the media industry is examined in many different ways, an ownership-
based approach is crucial; Gomery argues that “No research in mass communication can ignore 
questions of mass media ownership and the economic implications of that control” (p. 507, 
Compaine & Gomery, 2000).  
Compaine and Hoag (2012) provide evidence that innovation has a positive effect on the 
competitive landscape of the media industry. In a series of interviews with 30 media 
entrepreneurs, the researchers concluded that one of the main sources of support for the entry of 
new competitors in the media industry was “the critical role of technological innovation” (p. 34). 
To be sure, new entry does not automatically ensure increased competition: Start-up ventures can 
enter a market but quickly fail and exit without offering any meaningful competition or 
significant impact on the market structure of the industry.  Accordingly, if technological 
innovation supports entrepreneurs desiring to enter a new market or industry, does such new-firm 
entry ultimately affect the market structure (e.g., increased competition)? 
Peterson and Berger (1975) examined the market concentration of the music industry 
segment of the media industry over a 26 year period.  The primary research question considered 
the music segment’s market structure as an independent variable.  However, part of the study 
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was also designed to see how the variables—including market structure—changed during the 26 
years.  
 The researchers found a “concentration-competition cycle” (p. 158) during the 26 year 
period; the industry experienced three periods of rising corporate concentration interrupted by 
two periods of high competition.  The shifts from concentration to competition (and vice versa) 
were often precipitated by other events or influences.  In particular, Peterson and Berger note 
that the first shift—from concentration to competition in the mid-1950s—saw the expansion of 
more music production companies.  In the second half of this decade, the number of production 
companies achieving a hit on Billboard magazine tripled.  Peterson and Berger partly explain 
this shift from concentration to competition on technological innovation, specifically the advent 
of television. 
According to Peterson and Berger, this new medium of television influenced both the 
motion picture and radio industries, which in turn affected the recording industry in two key 
ways.  First, consumers now had a convenient, in-home alternative to motion pictures, and movie 
attendance significantly declined (p. 164).  Production companies—looking for new alternatives 
to replace this lost revenue—began entering the music recording industry, thereby increasing the 
number of competitors.   
Secondly, advertisers shifted significant portions of their budgets from radio to television, 
forcing radio stations to develop new strategies to combat the fact that audiences were choosing 
television over radio for what had been traditional radio programming (e.g., soap operas, comedy 
shows, dramatic series).  In response, radio stations developed new programming strategies that 
incorporated two elements.  The first element to the new programming strategy was to rely more 
heavily on recorded music.  The second element was for radio stations to differentiate 
themselves from competing stations by offering differing music formats.  The result of this new 
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strategy created an environment that supported an expansion of music outlets and a demand for 
more music “product,” thereby supporting more music production companies, and hence, 
increased competition.  
Alexander (1994) also examined the music industry to determine how new technology 
led to increased competition and de-concentration as measured by market share. His specific 
research objective was to examine the innovation/market structure relationship.  His study 
offered two important findings.  First, Alexander concluded that scale-reducing innovations 
positively influenced the level of competition within the music industry, as new entrants to the 
industry often drove the innovation, which increased their competitiveness vis-à-vis older, more 
established media companies.   
Secondly, those innovations leading to increased competition are exogenous in nature.  
Alexander found the 100 year period of 1890—1990 featured three periods of high concentration 
within the music production industry, and two intervening periods of increased competition.  
Both periods of increased competition were triggered by exogenous innovations; the innovations 
allowed for improvements in the production processes, which lowered costs, scales of 
efficiencies, and facilitated the entry of new start-up production operations.    Further, in both 
instances, these periods of increased competition were followed by periods of consolidation, as 
competitors merged or struggling companies ceased to exist altogether.  
The patterns described by Peterson and Berger as well as Alexander are consistent with 
the theoretical concepts of the Industry Life Cycle. Both research teams describe a pattern of 
initial introduction followed by a high growth phase with an increasing number of competitors. 
Ultimately the industry enters into a consolidation/retraction phase as some companies leave the 
industry through merger, failure, or a refocus in their respective corporate missions.  
Additionally, Alexander’s finding of two different innovations generating two different periods 
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of increased market competition (and subsequent consolidation) is consistent with the idea that 
exogenous influences can extend the life of an industry by generating a repeat of the earlier 
phases of the Industry Life Cycle. 
Other researchers have considered how the market structure influences innovation within 
a specific industry such as Dowd’s examination of the music recording industry (2004).   In 
particular, Dowd examined the U.S. recording industry over a 50-year period to see how 
concentration influenced innovation.  In this case, his definitions of concentration and innovation 
were somewhat different than the definitions being used in this study.  Dowd used the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure market concentration, but concentration was based on 
the number of hit singles produced by a company rather than revenues.  Additionally, Dowd 
operationalized innovation based on the number of new acts and the number of new firms that 
were included on the list of hit singles.   
Studies of innovation’s effect on the media industry in particular have typically focused 
on a particular segment, rather than the media as a whole (Alexander, 1994; Dowd, 2004; 
Peterson & Berger, 1975).  More recently, a few scholars have begun measuring the market 
structure of the media as a whole (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Compaine & Gomery, 2000). 
This work has not yet been extended to examine the effect that technological innovation may 
have on market structure.  
The existing literature, therefore, provides a foundation for additional research questions 
and hypotheses. Compaine and Gomery (2000) have studied the market structure of the media 
industry at two distinct points in time—1986 and 1997.  Extending this study to incorporate 
multiple years would capture any trends or countertrends that may provide a more intuitive 
understanding of the dynamics of the media industry during the second half of the 20th century 
and beyond. Such trends are consistent with those identified by Peterson and Berger (1975) in 
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their study of the music industry, which has experienced phases of ownership concentration, 
followed by phases of de-concentration, in part spurred by new technological innovation. 
In addition to measuring any trends related the market structure of the media industry 
over time, a second question to explore is whether or not technological innovation—particularly 
radical innovation—affects these trends. The literature reviewed in this chapter clearly supports 
such a hypothesis; studies involving other industries (Hannan & McDowell, 1990) as well as 
specific segments within the media industry (Alexander, 1994; Peterson & Berger, 1975) find 
that innovation affects the market structure of the media industry, albeit in different ways.  
However, without having longitudinal data on the market structure of the media, it has not been 
possible to confirm such a relationship between the media industry market structure and 
innovation.  
Finally, if the expected causal relationship is established between radical technological 
innovation and media market structure, such a finding would suggest the need to examine the 
nature and extent of this causal influence. Again, Peterson and Berger (1975) may provide some 
clues as to the nature of this influence:  Their findings seem to indicate that technological 
innovation initially generates a period of market expansion (i.e., de-concentration) but, as the 
innovation matures in the marketplace, such market expansion curtails and is eventually replaced 







 The literature reviewed in Chapter Two provides strong empirical support for the 
argument that innovation has a positive effect on a competitive market structure. There is a 
significant body of theoretical work that supports this argument as well.     
As noted in the previous chapter, Peterson and Berger (1975) make a compelling 
argument that as an innovation matures in the marketplace, the innovation’s influence on a 
competitive market structure diminishes, creating the potential for a reconsolidation and a more 
concentrated market structure of a particular industry.  Despite Peterson and Berger’s 
observations, tying an innovation’s effect specifically to its adoption rate has not been widely 
attempted.  The importance and significance of an innovation’s adoption pattern is heavily 
grounded in the theory of Diffusion of Innovations.  Section A discusses the general theory of 
Diffusion of Innovations, as well as the specific application within the business environment as 
explained by the Industry Life Cycle.   
Scholars of the relationship between innovation and market structure generally 
acknowledge Joseph Schumpeter and his work to be a critical foundation for such studies 
(Freeman, 1982; Langlois, 2002). Schumpeter’s theoretical perspective is particularly interesting 
because his arguments evolved over time, resulting in what some consider to be a dichotomy of 
conflicting viewpoints. Section B reviews Schumpeter’s work and evolution from one school of 
thought to the other as a means of contrasting and comparing the theories developed in the 
previous chapter.  
Lastly, Section C examines more closely the idea of radical and incremental innovations, 
particularly from a theoretical perspective to illustrate how such innovations could impact the 
market structure of the media industry.  
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A. Industry Life Cycles and the Impact of Adoption Curves 
 In his retrospective on factors that led to his developing the diffusion of innovations 
theory (and the subsequent growth in its applicability and usage), Rogers (2004) explained that it 
was his interest in developing a more “generaliz(ed) model of diffusion” (p. 16) that led him to 
publish Diffusion of Innovations.  As part of his argument for a general diffusion model, Rogers 
offered a model of the Innovation-Decision Process as well as a method of classifying adoption 
categories consistent with the S-shaped curve of cumulative adoption and the bell-shaped curve 
of adoption patterns over time as previously utilized in studies (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 
1943).  To be sure, these categories were not new to the study of diffusion, but Rogers’ work 
helped to set a standard with them.   
 Building upon this understanding of how ideas are “diffused” into society, researchers 
have utilized the Product Life Cycle as a means of understanding how new products are 
introduced and accepted into the marketplace (Dean, 1950; Levitt, 1965; Chandrasekaran & 
Tellis, 2011).  This literature and the literature on the adoption of innovations suggest that: 1) 
adoption rates can vary, and 2) these variable patterns of adoption may have differential 
influences on market structures. 
In a revised look at the product life cycle, Andrews (1975) suggests that the life cycle can 
be extended by revitalizing an already established product.  Such revitalization can come from 
product redesigns, new markets, or new applications for the product, among other strategies.  
The result is either an extension or prolonged effect of the maturity stage of life cycle, or a 
possible renewal of the cycle itself, whereby the renewed product returns to the introduction or 
growth stage.  Figure 1 illustrates both hypothetical scenarios. 
The previously-discussed study by Alexander (1994) is an example of such a renewal of 
the life cycle.  In his study, Alexander found that developments such as production 
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improvements could lead to the revitalization of a product, and extend the current stage or renew 
the life cycle by reverting back to an earlier growth phase. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Product Life Cycles.  (A comparison of three different 
product lifecycles, which illustrates the differences in the degree of adoption or 
acceptance of a product.) 
 
Building upon this idea, researchers such as Abernathy and Utterback have posited an 
industry life cycle theory (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978).  In this 
model, the unit of analysis is not the firm, but rather the production process (Peltoniemi, 2009). 
The industry life cycle is influenced by both radical and incremental innovations (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978).  Radical innovations tend to focus on enhancing performance and filling needs 
that heretofore have not been satisfied by existing product offerings within the industry.  On the 
other hand, incremental innovations generally impact the production processes and/or cost 
structure within an industry.  Radical innovations are usually the catalyst for new industries, 
whereas incremental innovations are typically more evident as an industry matures (Abernathy, 
1978).  
Gort and Klepper (1982) conclude that new technologies—like those termed “radical 
innovations” by Abernathy and Utterback—positively influence the growth of an industry 
because such innovations encourage the entry of new competitors and help to delay the 










elimination of existing and less efficient competitors.  Gort and Klepper suggest that later in the 
cycle these less efficient competitors exit the industry, driven by “intensified technological 
competition originating from sources internal to the industry” (p. 650).  This description of 
internally-generated technological advances is consistent with Abernathy and Utterback’s 
“incremental innovations.”  Gort and Klepper’s description of firm entry and firm exit support 
the idea that adoption rates for radical innovations initially propel more competitors capitalizing 
on these innovations, followed by a decline as the rate of adoption also declines.  
Gort and Klepper’s characterization of incremental innovations as “originating from 
sources internal to the industry” (p. 650) introduces the idea that innovations can be either 
endogenous or exogenous (Alexander, 1994; Brouwer, van Dalen, Roelandt, Ruiter, & van der 
Wiel, 2004).  In their review of previous research on market structure and innovation, Brouwer, 
et al. concluded: “Market structure and the degree of competition change as a result of 
(individual) firm’s innovation decision. And the changed market structure . . . changes the 
character of competition as well as the competitive pressure to innovate (“endogeneity 
problem”)” (p. 203, 2004).  Moreover, firms often make the strategic decision to compete 
through increased product innovation instead of through pricing.  Generally (though not always) 
such product innovations could be considered as “incremental innovations” that are 
incrementally improving the functionality or attractiveness of a particular product or service. 
In his examination of the changes in the market structure of the recording industry, 
Alexander observes the opposite: “Although one might expect significant new technologies to be 
endogenous (and hence proprietary), several important technological innovations in the music 
recording industry were, in fact, largely exogenous” (p. 114, 1994).    
Evans and Schmalensee (2002) attempt to explain these differences by explaining that 
some companies in some industries engage in “dynamic . . . for the market (competition) through 
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. . . winner-take-all races to produce drastic innovations, rather than through static price/output 
competition in the market” (p. 2).  Such “output competition” would clearly include incremental 
innovations designed to improve or enhance specific aspects of a product or service.  Conversely, 
“drastic innovations”—which Evans and Schmalensee argue are prevalent in high-technology 
industries—have a radical impact on the existing industry, often resulting in “creative 
destruction,” a term offered by Schumpeter (1950) to describe how innovation can destroy 
existing, established industries or companies and create new ones (p. 81). 
B. Schumpeter Theory 
The idea of creative destruction is a foundational tenet of the work of Joseph Schumpeter, 
who showed that the evolutionary nature of capitalism is influenced by innovation, whether it is 
manifested in the form of products, production methods, markets, or organizations (1950). As 
innovation brings about improved products and processes, it also weakens and destroys those 
well-entrenched organizations that had succeeded by relying on products and processes now 
made obsolete by the latest innovations.  As Scherer (1992) explained, “Innovation . . . destroyed 
old monopolies while creating new economic value” (p. 1418). This process of destroying 
market leaders and replacing them with new ones is the heart of Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction.  
The nature of this innovation, however, has been explained by Schumpeter with 
sometimes different and conflicting rationales (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1950).  In his 
early work, The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) champions the 
entrepreneur as the agent of this innovation.  It would be the entrepreneur—either as an 
individual or small business—through innovation, that would challenge established market 
leaders and usher in a new round of creative destruction.  By 1950, however, Schumpeter seemed 
to offer a different view, positing in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, that it was the large, 
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established firm—with its greater capacity for investment—that was able to effectively spur new 
innovation (1950). Moreover, the large firm’s incentive to invest in new innovation came from a 
desire to further dominate an existing market, hence, such innovation tended to have the effect of 
increasing concentration within a market or industry. 
Researchers have subsequently argued on behalf of either of these two philosophies—
dubbed by many as “Schumpeter I” and “Schumpeter II” (Freeman, 1982; Langlois, 2002).  
Relying on a series of simulation experiments within a hypothetical 16-firm industry, Nelson and 
Winter (1978) attempted to identify those variables that facilitated concentration within the 
industry.  The researchers concluded that investment in new innovative technologies results in an 
increasingly concentrated market, as “Some firms track emerging technological opportunities 
with greater success than other firms; the former tend to prosper and grow; the latter to suffer 
losses and decline” (p. 542).  Such a conclusion would generally support the Schumpeter II idea 
that larger firms, not smaller firms, are the real agents of innovation. 
On the other hand, Geroski (1990) found that increased innovation within an industry led 
to reduced concentration. In such a case, smaller, entrepreneurial entities—as referred to by 
Schumpeter in The Theory of Economic Development (1934) (“Schumpeter I”)—would likely be 
the agents of change and the catalyst for creative destruction. Rather than utilizing simulation 
techniques, Geroski relied on data of actual technological advances by industry over a 10-year 
period.  
Hospers (2005) notes that Schumpeter “has long inspired social scientists and their 
research . . . (but has) not engendered an unambiguous interpretation of his ideas” (p. 25), while 
Scherer (1992) simply summarizes the debate by saying, “The only simple conclusion stemming 
from . . . theoretical research stimulated by Schumpeter . . . is that the links between market 
structure, innovation, and economic welfare are extremely complex” (p. 1421).  This complexity 
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supports a research approach that seeks to examine innovation and market structure within a 
specific context (e.g., industry). 
C. A Theoretical Application of Radical and Incremental Innovation 
The existing literature features different approaches to explaining how differences in 
innovations (e.g., radical vs. incremental, endogenous vs. exogenous) may influence market 
structures.  While the different approaches are not necessarily contradictory, it is not well 
established that they are complementary, either.  This study does not seek to explain these 
differences; however, it is anticipated that the results of this study will provide a foundation for a 
framework that can be used to develop a thorough explanation of the dynamics between radical 
and incremental innovation.  Specifically, theory suggests that radical innovations lead to a 
“creative destruction” where new competitors challenge—and often replace—old industry 
leaders. Eventually, an industry stabilizes and shifts in market structure tend to be minimal, often 
within a small group of competitors within the overall industry.  Those smaller shifts reflect the 
ongoing efforts price/output competition, often considered incremental innovation.  Figure 2 
illustrates a hypothetical scenario, where an industry over time feels the effect of the adoption of 
two different radical innovations by the marketplace, including an expanded market structure and 
increased competitive levels.   
Over time, as the adoption of either innovation decreases, the market structure may 
consolidate or maintain some sense of equilibrium, although an individual competitor within the 
industry may gain or lose market power vis-à-vis other competitors.  This study will provide 
insight on the effect of radical innovations on the market structure of the media industry.  The  
hypothesized trend in Figure 2 suggests that radical innovations—rather than creating a single 
concentrating or deconcentrating effect on market structure—generates a market expansion in 
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reaction to rising adoption trends of the innovation, and a subsequent market consolidation as the 























This hypothesized trend also suggests that incremental innovations may be more 
prevalent during periods where market structures are relatively stable, as companies seek to gain 
competitive advantages over others in the industry with their own innovation.  Such a situation 
may actually show that innovation (particularly incremental innovation) can in fact influence the 
market structure of the industry.  As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the idea that 
endogenous, incremental innovations may be the result of the media industry’s market structure 
is a question that warrants further study.  However, this study specifically examines radical 
innovation, and recognizes that such radical innovations are exogenous shocks to the industry 

















Figure 2. Theoretical Trend, Innovation-to-Concentration. (An illustration of 
the hypothesized relationship between the adoption rate of an innovation and 
the market concentration of an affected industry.) 
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that lead to changes in the market structure of the industry.  As a result, reverse causality is not a 
major concern with this study because the focus of this study is specifically focused on 








Thus far, the review of previous literature has provided evidence that innovation 
influences the market structure of varied industries (Compaine & Hoag, 2012; Geroski & 
Pomroy, 1990; Hannan & McDowell, 1990; Mansfield, 1983).  In addition, the review indicates 
a prevailing concern over the market structure of the media industry; specifically, the concern of 
a growing concentrated ownership structure, and the subsequent diminished diversity of ideas 
and information resulting from such concentration. The previous research suggests the need to 
further examine the relationship between innovation and the market structure of the media. As 
with most meaningful research, it also encourages even more questions to consider.  This chapter 
outlines some of those questions.   
Section A reviews the need to quantify the level of market concentration in the media 
industry, and to track the trend of such concentration over the last 60 years.  Having established 
the history of the media market structure for this time frame, it is then possible to examine 
specific media innovations (for this study, television, cable television, and the Internet) in order 
to see if such innovations had an effect on media market structure.  Section B examines the 
introduction and adoption of television as a new medium in American society, and the effect it 
had on the market structure of the media.  Similarly, Sections C and D examine these same 
questions, but as they relate to cable television and the Internet respectively.   
A. Measuring the Market Structure of the Media 
Previous studies of the market structure of the media industry have generally focused on 
a specific segment of the industry (Bednarski, 2003; Drushel, 1998; Greco, 2000; Howard, 1998) 
as opposed to considering the media industry in its entirety.  Researchers have often relied on 
this approach because historically, competition in the media industry has often been considered 
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segment-specific. For example, notwithstanding differences in programming choices, competing 
radio stations can offer listeners (and advertisers) suitable and acceptable alternatives to listeners 
wishing to access programming via the radio, or advertisers wishing to reach an audience of 
radio listeners.  On the other hand, listeners of radio are not likely to consider magazines and 
their content as acceptable alternatives to radio programming.  This substitutability logic has 
been the basis of examining market structures in a segment-specific manner.   
1. Studying Media Market Structure by Segment.  Howard (1998) sought to determine 
if implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”), which relaxed 
ownership restrictions throughout the entire media industry, affected ownership diversity among 
television stations. While ownership consolidation had been evident for over two decades within 
the television industry, Howard found that passage of the 1996 Act brought a noticeable and 
marked increase in consolidation of ownership.  However, he also concluded that despite this 
increased consolidation, ownership diversity was still quite apparent within the television 
industry, as reflected by more than 184 group owners and the continuation of many local owners. 
Bednarski also examined the effects of the 1996 Act, focusing on ownership of radio 
stations (2003). She found a 25% decrease in the number of radio station owners during the five 
years immediately following passage of the 1996 Act.  Similarly, Drushel—also studying the 
effects of the 1996 Act on the radio industry—observed a 100% increase in concentration levels  
of ownership between the years 1992 and 1997, thus offering a comparison of radio ownership 
before and after implementation of the 1996 Act (1998).  Finally, Chambers (2001) examined the 
effect of the 1996 Act on radio ownership within markets with populations of less than 125,000.  
Again, the result was a decrease in ownership diversity.   
In another study, Greco concluded the U.S. consumer book industry for the years 1995 
and 1996 was “moderately concentrated,” as defined by industry accepted standards (2000).   
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Despite significant merger activity among book publishers during this time, ownership 
concentration actually decreased.  Greco reasoned the increase reflected the fact that smaller 
publishers, capitalizing on industry turmoil resulting from larger firms merging and 
consolidation operations, were able to expand through internal growth instead of through 
acquisitions. 
2. Studying Market Structure of the “Media as a Whole.” As media companies 
continue to merge to converge, the argument for studying media ownership across all segments 
becomes more compelling (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996, Compaine & Gomery, 2000).  This 
argument reflects the ongoing convergence of multiple media platforms into fewer but more 
robust and flexible platforms that allow similar content to easily be distributed in many different 
ways (Jenkins, 2008). One of the results of such convergence is greater substitutability among 
(not just within) different medium formats.  Thierer (2005) posits that such substitutability can 
vary in degrees but generate competition among media companies that previously might not have 
been viewed as competitors. He points out that “rapid technological convergence has made it 
increasingly difficult to distinguish one type of media outlet from another” (p. 40). 
Albarran and Dimmick (1996) measured ownership concentration levels within several 
media industry segments, but also “across-industry concentration” among the top four and top 
eight media companies in 1994.  The researchers relied on existing concentration ratios that have 
been previously used to measure media concentration (Chan-Olmsted & Litman, 1988; Owen, 
Beebe, & Manning, 1974; Picard, 1988). Using these ratios, the researchers found high 
ownership concentration in specific segments, but found that “in terms of total industry revenues 
the communication industries as a whole have not yet reached levels indicating high 
concentration” (p. 48, Albarran & Dimmick, 1996). 
33 
 
 Noam (2009) examined ownership concentration across the entire mass media industry 
but also measured concentration across all content programming (i.e., providers) and content 
distribution (i.e., deliverers).  Noam measured key points in time during the 1984—2005 
timeframe.  Regarding horizontal concentration, he found concentration among content providers 
had slightly increased during the time studied, but had stayed at concentrated levels throughout 
the entire period.  Among content distributors, concentration increased dramatically from 1992-
2005, but, as with content providers, the level of concentration was consistently within 
“unconcentrated” levels. 
 To measure ownership concentration across the entire mass media industry, Noam 
considered a firm’s presence across all media sectors, represented by a Sector Share Index.  He 
found concentration increased over the 1984-2005 timeframe, particularly among the largest 
companies. During this timeframe, the share of the mass media industry held by the top ten firms 
doubled from 17.7% to 35.5%.  He also considered the relative strength of vertically integrated 
firms, recognizing that a vertically integrated firm may benefit from market strength in some—
but not all—segments in which the firm competes.  Here, he again found an increasing trend in 
concentration among the top 25 firms, most markedly among the top five mass media companies. 
Compaine and Gomery reinforced the finding that the media industry as a whole is not 
concentrated by comparing ownership concentration at two points in time—1986 and 1997 
(Compaine & Gomery, 2000).  These two years represent significant milestones within media 
regulatory history:  The first milestone is shortly after the Federal Communications Commission 
eased its ownership rules (F.C.C., 1985).  The new rules enacted in 1984 increased the number of 
broadcast properties that could be owned by one entity. The second milestone—1997—is the 
year after passage of the 1996 Act, which further eased ownership restrictions.  Compaine and 
Gomery measured ownership concentration among the top four, top eight, and top 50 media 
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companies for both years.  In all cases, concentration increased from 1986 to 1997, but the 
increase was minimal, and the overall measures of concentration were very low, prompting the 
researchers to conclude that “the media industry remains one of the most competitive major 
industries in U.S. commerce” (p. 562, Compaine & Gomery, 2000). 
The Albarran and Dimmick study, while laying a solid foundation for the “media as a 
whole” approach, nevertheless lacked two desirable elements.  First, the study looked at the 
industry for just one year, rather than examining several years, making it impractical to reach 
conclusions with a high degree of reliability.  Second, the study only considered the top four and 
eight companies within the media industry, which can present an incomplete picture of an 
industry’s diversity and competitiveness (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Owen, Beebe, & 
Manning, 1974), raising potential questions of the study’s external validity. Accordingly, 
Albarran and Dimmick’s study could be enhanced by incorporating a longitudinal perspective 
and by including a greater number of media companies. 
 Compaine and Gomery’s approach addresses both of these issues, but still leaves room 
for further examination (2000).  By measuring ownership concentration at two different points in 
time, the researchers enhance the temporal aspect of the study.  However, the fact that 
concentration increased from 1986 to 1997 does not necessarily indicate a consistent upward 
trend during that 11-year period.  Did media concentration increase in a constant straight line, or 
was the increase punctuated with peaks and valleys throughout?  Such insight would offer a 
greater understanding of trends in media ownership.  Compaine and Gomery’s study also offers 
greater statistical external validity, as they measured concentration among the top 50 firms.  
However, including an even larger sample of companies would present a more complete picture 
of media industry market structure.   
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Building upon the “media as a whole” concept established by Albarran and Dimmick 
(1996) as well as Compaine and Gomery (2000), Vizcarrondo (in press) provides a more 
longitudinal perspective of the trends and shifts in the concentration of the media industry.  
Using revenue figures for media companies over a 35-year timeframe, Vizcarrondo found—
consistent with the previous studies utilizing the “media as a whole” approach—that the media 
industry has been “consistently characterized by unconcentrated and diverse ownership” (in 
press).   
In addition, Vizcarrondo also noted three distinct trends during the 35-year timeframe: an 
initial period of declining concentration within the media industry followed by a period of 
general stability and minimal changes from year-to-year, and a final period of rising 
concentration.  Such changing trends support the idea that a better understanding of how and 
why such shifts is warranted.  This study then, seeks to understand what causes the market 
structure of the media industry to change over a longitudinal period of time by specifically 
examining the effect of three different technological innovations which have had a major impact 
on the media industry.  This study begins by expanding the work of Vizcarrondo to measure the 
market structure of the media as a whole over a longer period of time; specifically, the years 
1950—2009. 
RQ1:  How has the market structure of the media industry evolved over time? 
B. Television’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry 
The invention of the television is not credited to one particular innovator, but rather 
viewed as the outcome of many years of innovation by many individuals (Winston, 2003).  
Indeed, numerous individuals, businesses and research organizations were independently 
working to be the first to develop a working solution to the idea of a mass communication tool 
that could broadcast over the airwaves like the radio, but provide the visual element as well.  
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With the stock market crash of 1929, many of these fledgling entrepreneurial endeavors lost their 
sources of funding, thereby also losing race to be the first to have a working prototype (Godfrey, 
2001). The result was a competition between two vastly different men.  Philo T. Farnsworth, a 
self-made man from the Western U.S. had impressively developed what is believed to be the first 
truly working model of a television, while David Sarnoff—a titan in the media industry—had 
successfully navigated his way to become President of RCA (Radio Corporation of America) and 
therefore had access to significant resources to support an ongoing and aggressive research and 
development effort in his quest to be the first to offer a commercially viable television to the 
market. 
While a few commercial broadcasters were operating in the United States in the early 
1930s, two key milestones during the late 30s and early 40s are seen as watershed events in the 
early history of television (Edgerton, 2007; Larsen, 1962).  The 1939 World’s Fair in New York 
City prominently featured the television in the RCA exhibit (Edgerton, 2007).  Sarnoff—a 
member of the Fair’s executive planning committee—saw the fair as an opportunity to 
demonstrate his company’s latest technology.  It was, as Edgerton reflects, television’s “coming-
out party at the RCA exhibit” (p. 6).  Just two years later the F.C.C. formally approved 
commercial telecasting in the United States, representing what some see as a de facto starting 
point for commercial television (Larsen, 1962).   
Subsequent to these two milestones, scholars note a rapid adoption of television by U.S. 
consumers, and television quickly supplanted radio as the primary medium of information and 
entertainment (Fullerton, 1988; Larsen, 1962).  These initial years of commercial television did 
not necessarily generate an explosion of new companies and new competitors; indeed, the 
competition for leadership of this emerging industry seemed to be between Sarnoff’s RCA and 
another radio powerhouse—the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)—led by William Paley 
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(Edgerton, 2007).  However, the FCC—in approving commercial television broadcasting—also 
implemented rules designed to eliminate noncompetitive conditions, paving the way for future 
entrants into this fledgling new medium.  By 1948, the U.S. television industry featured four 
networks and 52 stations transmitting programming to nearly one million televisions in 29 
different cities (Winston, 2003).   
Consistent with Gort and Klepper’s (1982) description of the industry life cycle—which 
argues that new technologies initially will positively influence the growth of an industry, but 
then later result in the exit of less efficient competitors—this study hypothesizes that the new 
technology of television in the 1930s and 1940s had a similar causal effect on the market 
structure of the media industry.  A positive relationship between the adoption of television and 
the market structure of the media industry, therefore, would mean that increases in the adoption 
rate of television would lead to an increased level of competition within the media industry.   
H1: Changes in the adoption rate of television as a new media innovation should be 
inversely related to changes in the market concentration of the media industry.  
C. Cable Television’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry 
With the advent of television as a viable communications medium for the general public 
came an irony:  Supporters of this new medium saw this as public good that could provide 
benefits to the masses, but the reality was that this new medium was in many ways, strictly for 
elites.  The cost of a new television was out of reach for most consumers (Television History--
The First 75 Years), and, equally important, broadcast signals from television stations could only 
reach households within a limited range from the broadcast stations (Mullen, 2008).  As such, 
this new medium that was hoped to be a way to communicate to the diverse masses throughout 
the country was—from a practical standpoint—only broadcasting to those areas within the reach 
of a television station’s signal, generally large metropolitan areas.   
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Such a difference between the desired and actual effect of television on society created 
pressures for new solutions and alternatives that could extend the reach of television’s 
broadcasting capabilities. During the second half of the 20th century, the nature and role of cable 
television would evolve in response to political, economic, and technological forces (Parsons & 
Frieden, 1998).  Parsons and Frieden characterize the evolution of cable television as having 
three distinct phases.   
The first phase—from cable TV’s inception through 1975—saw the medium primarily as 
a tool to facilitate the retransmission and distribution of broadcast television to those remote 
areas without local broadcast service.  The service was known at that time as Community 
Antenna television—later Community Access television—or CATV, reflecting the primary 
purpose of the medium.2   
The second phase—1975-1996—saw “CATV” become “cable television,” as technology 
(most notably satellite) helped transform the medium into a major distribution channel for 
programming beyond that of retransmitted broadcast stations’ offerings.  Pioneers such as Time-
Life’s Home Box Office channel (History of HBO) and Ted Turner’s WTCG superstation 
(Mullen, 2008)—the forerunner to TBS—utilized the burgeoning technology and changing 
regulatory climate to transform cable television into a consumer choice with expanded offerings 
that had not been available during the first phase of the medium’s history.   
Finally, Parsons and Frieden describe a current, third phase of cable television as a period 
of “promoted competition and eliminat(ed) barriers to market entry,” thanks to the combination 
of technology (e.g., digital communications) and deregulation (e.g., The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996) (p. 20). 
                                                          
2 In an interesting exception to this primary purpose, Parsons and Frieden also point out that early forerunners to 
CATV services were developed in large metropolitan areas.  Apartment building owners—wishing to prevent the 
numerous television antennae arising from their tenants’ individual apartment windows or rooftops—chose instead 
to install a master antenna, and retransmit the broadcast signals via wire into each rental unit. 
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The rise of cable television as a pervasive telecommunications medium, therefore, gives 
justification to considering its effect on the media industry’s market structure, and its 
adoption/growth patterns.  It is hypothesized that increases in the adoption rate of cable 
television will lead to an increased level of competition within the media industry.   
H2: Changes in the adoption rate of cable television as a new media innovation should be 
inversely related to changes in the market concentration of the media industry.  
D.  The Internet’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry 
Despite his indications to the contrary, Al Gore did not invent or create the Internet 
(Transcript Late Edition, 1999).  Rather than an invention, the Internet is really more of a 
development over time, gradually formed over the last fifty years.  As early as 1961, scientists 
began proposing an economically and technologically viable solution enabling remote computers 
to connect and transfer information to each other.   
Largely motivated by Department of Defense initiatives, this networking functionality 
was refined until the first host-to-host protocol—Network Control Protocol—started in 1970 
(Zakon, 2003). The networks of computers and their data transfer capabilities were very basic—
some email functionality and a file transfer program. For most of the 1970s and 1980s this 
network was used primarily for technical and governmental applications. Even mainstream 
businesses were not big users of Internet technology. The communication was very basic during 
this time; the Internet was a tool that was only functional in a simple text environment. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, five key developments occurred that would change the 
landscape of the Internet and transform it into a virtually ubiquitous communications medium.  
The first milestone was the development of HTML (Hypertext Markup Language), a 
programming language that enabled easier creation and use of computer images, thereby 
encouraging visual communication as a practical element of the Internet (Sturken & Cartwright, 
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2001). The ability to communicate visually and not just textually in this medium made it more 
“user-friendly and more likely to be adopted by mass audiences. 
The second development was the creation of the World Wide Web by CERN in 1991. As 
a part of the Internet, the “web” (as it has become known) was envisioned as a more accessible 
portal for mainstream users and communicators. By 1996, the web would become the service 
with the greatest traffic on the Internet (Zakon, 2003). 
The third milestone was really more of a trend. From the mid-1990s to today, the 
dropping prices for personal computers has made this product more affordable for the average 
consumer, and ownership of PCs has grown tremendously (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000). 
Finally, the fourth milestone was the introduction of on-line dial up systems, or Internet 
service providers (ISP’s) such as America Online and Prodigy (Zakon, 2005). These providers 
delivered Internet accessibility to the average consumer who was often computer 
unsophisticated. Prior to these easy-to-use services, most consumers were either too intimidated 
or too overwhelmed by the seemingly complex nature of accessing and communicating through 
the web. 
As consumers became more comfortable with personal computers and accessing the 
Internet through CERN’s3 World Wide Web, both users and usage increased significantly 
(Abbate, 1999).  Quickly, new services went beyond just locating information, but also gave 
users—both individuals and companies—the ability to create information, entertainment, and 
applications themselves (Schatz & Hardin, 1994).  This ability for individuals to create their own 
content has ushered in the fifth milestone—Web 2.0—in history of the Internet.  Also knows as 
the “read/write Web,” this phase of the development of the Internet has given greater power to 
                                                          
3 CERN is an acronym for the European Organization for Nuclear Research, or more literally, the French Conseil 
Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire. 
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individuals by not only letting them choose what content they see, but also to create and 
distribute their own content, effectively bypassing many of the traditional intermediaries (i.e., 
media companies) that have historically been the creators and distributors of such content (Ajjan 
& Hartshorne, 2008). 
As Ajjan & Hartshorne note, Web 2.0 has “change(d) the way documents are created, 
sued, shared and distributed . . . and the increased need for tools to quickly create, analyze and 
exchange . . . information . . .(has) fueled a surge in the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies” (p. 
71).  These technologies yet again are the result of innovation and have introduced a new group 
of upstart companies competing with older established media companies to meet the growing 
demand for new hardware and software from consumers wishing to capitalize on Web 2.0’s 
social media offerings and capabilities. 
Given this shake-up in how information is created and disseminated, and the companies 
that are engaged in this process, the Internet has become a key area to explore to see what (if 
any) impact this new medium has had on ownership diversity. Many see the Internet as yet one 
more way for the large, dominant media companies to extend their dominance (McChesney, 
1999). Others see an existent or potential increase in diversity as a result of the Internet. Benkler 
(2003) argues that the Internet empowers individuals to originate, distribute, and receive 
messages without intermediaries (gatekeepers), which has helped create a networked public 
sphere that effectively neutralizes any power inherent in a pre-Internet media industry. Indeed, 
Benkler argues “The pattern of information flow in such a network is more resistant to the 
application of control or influence than was the mass-media model” (p. 261).  
Moreover, Benkler provides a detailed analysis of power law distributions and network 
topology related to the Internet to support his contention that there is an “intrinsic process” (p. 
261) that enables all voices to be heard. The analysis, however, measures a website’s power 
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(and, therefore, the owner’s power) by the number of links that can direct traffic to the website. 
Such a framework can be useful, but does not allow for measuring ownership in economic or 
financial terms. 
Hindman (2009) has explored the idea of media concentration within the Internet, and has 
attempted to compare this concentration to other media outlets. In his study, he observed and 
concluded “that online audiences are at least as concentrated as those in the traditional media” (p. 
96).  Hindman’s study, however, used website traffic (or circulation/audience figures, for 
traditional media) to determine a media outlet’s strength, not financial or economic data such as 
revenues.  
Further, Hindman treats each “media outlet” (e.g., radio station) as an individual member 
of the group. Such an approach does not, therefore, allow for the fact that one media company 
could own multiple outlets. Inasmuch as this issue of ownership concentration is largely 
concerned with the effect of consolidation, and a single entity owning multiple outlets, this study 
doesn’t allow for definite conclusions or observations with respect to that concern. For 
measuring traffic distribution, Hindman’s study could be of value; for purposes of determining 
ownership diversity, however, his model is unable to allow for key factors. 
It is clear that many different researchers have tried to understand the competitive 
structure of the Internet.  Indeed, such attention to this issue is a testament to the influence that 
the Internet has already garnered as a mass medium in such a short period of time.  The Internet 
has been regarded by some as the fastest growing medium (Rooh-e-Aslam, Ali, & Shabir, 2009).  
Given its rapid growth and pervasiveness in society and throughout the media industry, it is 
important to examine the pattern of its adoption and its effect on the market structure of the 
media industry.  It is hypothesized that increases in the adoption rate of the Internet will lead to 
an increased level of competition within the media industry.   
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H3: Changes in the adoption rate of the Internet as a new media innovation should be 







 In order to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Four, several different measurements 
will be used.  First, change in the market structure of the media industry will be measured on an 
annual basis.  Section A discusses different measurements that can be used to quantify market 
structure, and provides justification for using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) as the 
preferred measure of market structure.  The change in the annual levels of HHI will be the 
dependent variable for this study. Additionally, Section A describes the data to be collected and 
how it will be analyzed in order to calculate the HHI and change in HHI.  
Section B operationalizes the adoption rate of each of the three technological innovations 
studied in this project—television, cable television, and the Internet.  The annual changes in 
these measures will be the independent variables for the study.  Section B explains the data 
collection procedures required in order to measure the change in the annual adoption rate for 
each innovation examined in the study.  Recognizing that other influences may also affect the 
changing market structure of the media industry, two variables designed to measure government 
regulation and changes in economic conditions are also included in the analysis as control 
variables.    Section C explains how these variables will be operationalized and measured. 
 Finally, OLS regression will be employed to determine the presence of a causal 
relationship between changes in innovation adoption and changes in media market structure. 
Section D outlines the empirical strategy that will be used.  For all of the change variables to be 
studied, the logarithm of the value of the year-to-year change will be used.4 
  
                                                          
4 The change variables are GDP and the adoption rates of each technological innovation. Regulatory environment is 
not a change variable.  
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A. Dependent Variable: Measuring Market Structure 
This study will determine and measure the effect that innovation has on the market 
structure of the media industry.  As such, the dependent variable for this study will be a 
measurement of annual change in the market structure of the media industry.  As stated above, 
this study operationalizes market structure as a measurement of ownership concentration, as 
defined by market share held by each company. 
1. Measurement Instruments.   There are numerous tools for measuring ownership 
concentration among a group of companies. The HHI will be used to measure the market 
structure of the media industry in this study.  The benefits for using the HHI over other measures 
of concentration will be explained further in this section. 
 a. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  The HHI is one of the most widely used 
measurements of ownership concentration within a particular industry or other group of 
companies (McCauliffe, 1997).  The HHI is used by many regulatory agencies including the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Federal Reserve Bank.  It is 
one of the factors that regulators consider when studying a merger’s potential effect on the 
competitive landscape of a particular industry or market (Department of Justice, 2010). 
 The HHI is the sum of squares of the market shares of all firms within the group of 






2)( , where MS i  
represents the market share of firm i with n firms in the market.  The resulting sum of these 
squared market shares—the HHI—can be as high as 10,000 (which would show monopolistic 
concentration and, hence, no ownership diversity) or as low as < 1.0 (for a highly diversified 
market or industry).  For example, a true monopoly, in which one company has 100% of the 
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market share, would have an HHI of 10,000 (1002 = 10,000).  On the other hand, a market with 







 The Department of Justice, when assessing the impact of proposed mergers, considers an 
industry or market to be “unconcentrated” if the HHI measurement is 1500 or less (Department 
of Justice, 2010). Those markets with an HHI measurement between 1500 and 2500 are 
considered to be “moderately concentrated,” and markets with an HHI measurement greater than 
2500 are considered “highly concentrated.”  
 One of the advantages of the HHI ratio is that it considers a greater number of companies 
within a particular industry or market and it considers the impact of each individual company’s 
market share on the overall concentration measure (e.g., HHI).  For example, one market with 
four companies could be much more concentrated than another market with the same number of 
companies simply because of different market share distributions. 
 Once the concentration level has been determined by calculating the HHI, year-to-year 
differences will be calculated and used as the dependent variable.  Changes in concentration are a 
more appropriate measurement to use as the dependent variable; the “impact” or effect that the 
independent variables generate are more meaningfully portrayed in the change of the level of 
market structure. 
b. CR4 and CR8 ratios.  The C4 and C8 ratios measure concentration within an industry 
or market by adding the market shares of the top four (or eight) firms within the targeted industry 
(Albarran & Dimmick, 1996).  These ratios were utilized in Albarran and Dimmick’s study of 
“across industry concentration,” which found high concentration within certain segments of the 
media industry, but no level of high concentration within the media industry as a whole (1996).  
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Because the CR ratios only consider four or eight companies within an industry, the ratios may 
present an incomplete and inaccurate picture of that industry.  For example, two industries with 
identical market share distributions among its respective top eight firms would have equal CR8 
scores, even if one of those industries had 50 additional companies with relatively small market 
shares.   
c. HHI vs. CR ratios. While the HHI ratio and the CR ratios both provide some indication 
of a market’s concentration, even Albarran and Dimmick, when using the CR4 and CR8 ratios in 
their study, acknowledged the HHI was “the best measure of concentration” (p. 44, 1996).  Their 
study did not use the HHI because of their inability to include every company within the media 
industry, including private firms that do not make revenue figures available to the public. This 
perceived limitation is unwarranted because the market share for any single smaller firm—
particularly with numerous competitors in the industry—does not by itself significantly impact 
the HHI (Greco, 2000).  
 Moreover, the HHI has been widely used when studying different aspects of media 
concentration, including content diversity (Einstein, 2002; Napoli, 1997) as well as ownership 
concentration or market structure (Compaine & Gomery, 2000; Drushel, 1998; Greco, 2000; 
Noam, 2009). The HHI is therefore considered to be a more robust and appropriate measurement 
of ownership concentration than are the CR4 and CR8 ratios.  Because of its strengths, the HHI 
will be the measurement-of-choice when testing for any relationship between market structure 
and innovation. 
 Appendix B lists values calculated for the HHI from 1950-2009.  Appendix A provides a 
sample of  the companies that were included in the study in order to calculate the HHI; the 
sample in Appendix A includes all companies for the years 1950,1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009. 
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2. Sample Selection.  The sample in this study will include publicly traded corporations 
with media operations in the United States. Publicly traded companies are the measured 
population for both practical and theoretical reasons.  Because this study relies on market shares 
based on revenues, it will be necessary to access annual revenue figures for each media 
company, which is required of all publicly traded companies.  Privately-owned media 
companies—which by definition are not required to publicly release financial data—could 
therefore not be included in this study, as their revenue figures would likely not be available.  
 Moreover, public companies must ensure that the financial information released has been 
audited by an independent auditing firm.  In the unlikely event that a private company did release 
financial information to the public, there is no requirement that the information be complete or 
independently verified.  As such, it is only practical to include revenue data for publicly traded 
companies. 
 There is also a theoretical basis for not including firms that are not publicly traded 
companies.  Dunaway (2008, 2011) has argued that private (i.e., not publicly traded) companies 
do not have the same financial pressures and constraints as publicly traded firms, and therefore 
are more able and more likely to be managed for other objectives besides just profitability and 
revenue growth.  As a result, it is likely that concerns of diminishing diversity and localism are 
not as prevalent when examining smaller, private companies.  These concerns are often what 
drive media policymakers calling for regulation that would hinder larger conglomerates from 
gaining even further market power (Baker, 2007).  Therefore, publicly traded companies are the 
most likely suspects for engaging in monopolistic behavior and also may be those most likely to 
be the targets of government regulation. 
As detailed in Chapter One, companies in the U.S. media industry are defined as those 
companies in the business of creating, distributing, or owning content for consumption by mass 
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audiences.  This definition differs slightly from Compaine and Gomery’s (2000) definition who 
include local and long distance telephone providers in their sample.  The present study does not 
include telephone service providers unless they offer other mass media related services (e.g., 
cable television, Internet services).  In those cases, the media-related revenues will be included. 
Companies included in this study classified primarily within the ‘51’ sector of the North 
American Industry Classification System—NAICS.  The NAICS is a system of classifying 
businesses to allow for easier collection of meaningful statistical data related to businesses and 
the business economy in general (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). The NAICS—developed jointly by 
the U.S., Canada and Mexico, replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) 
in 1997.  Within the NAICS, sector 51 includes all companies in the information industries, and 
includes subsectors such as publishing, motion picture, broadcasting, and telecommunications.   
An additional sector—sector 71—includes companies in the “Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation” industries.  However, these organizations are generally non-media related: 
subsectors include museums, performing arts, and gambling.   
Beyond relying on the NAICS categories to draw the sample, additional sources have 
been used to identify other companies with media-related operations that may not have been 
included in either the 51 or 71 sectors.  These include the Value Line Investment Survey, which 
offers independent investment information and covers more than 1,700 publicly traded 
companies (Value Line, 2012). Relevant industries within the Value Line database include Cable 
TV, Entertainment, Information Services, Internet, Newspaper, Publishing, and Telecom 
Services.  Within these industries, a company may or may not be included, depending on the 
specific types of revenue-generating activity the company is engaged in.   This method, for 
example, resulted in the addition of companies such as The Washington Post Corporation—
which owns educational and test preparation services through its Kaplan, Inc. subsidiary.  The 
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Washington Post Corporation was categorized by the NAICS in its Educational Services (61) 
sector.  As such, it would not have been included by only considering companies listed in the 
NAICS as being in either sector 51 or 71. 
In addition, foreign companies are included if they engage in meaningful media 
operations in the United States. Examples of such companies include Japanese-based Sony 
Corporation and the German-based company Bertelsmann. In these cases, only revenues 
generated within the United States—as reported in the company’s annual reports—were included 
in the market share calculations. 
3. Data Collection Methods.  Revenues used in this study were accessed through 
Compustat North America.  The Compustat North America database provides historical and 
restated financial data on active and inactive publicly traded companies, which allows year-to-
year comparisons.  For most companies in the database, annual financial history is available 
going back to 1950 (Standard & Poor's, 2011).  For the years 1975 and beyond, Compustat 
provides total annual revenues as well as revenues generated by operating segments and 
geographic segments.  For these years, it is possible to include only revenues associated with 
media-related businesses in the United States, which is the focus of this study.  
This allows for using only revenues that were derived from U.S. operations, which is a 
better measurement of market structure within the U.S. media industry.  For example, News 
Corporation reported revenues in fiscal year 2009 of $30 billion (News Corporation, 2009). 
However, the company also indicated that $16.6 billion of these revenues came from U.S. 
operations; the remaining revenues were generated from operations throughout the rest of the 
world.  In assessing News Corporation’s market share of the U.S. media industry, only those 
revenues generated from U.S. operations (i.e., $16.6 billion) would be considered.  In doing so, 
News Corporation is more accurately portrayed as a company that is very similar to Time 
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Warner Cable, which reported revenues in 2009 of $15.9 billion (Time Warner Cable Inc., 
2009).  By eliminating revenues generated from non-U.S. operations, a more accurate picture of 
the U.S. media market is presented. 
In addition, only revenues derived from media operations were included.  As a result, 
revenues for Walt Disney Company’s theme parks and consumer products, for example, were 
not included.  Disney reported total revenues in 2009 of $36.1 billion (The Walt Disney 
Company, 2009).  However, when eliminating “non-media” operations (e.g., theme parks, 
consumer products, etc.), revenues are $22.3 billion.  Accordingly, revenue figures in this study 
may be different than total revenues reported by a particular company for a specific fiscal year. 
 The examples of News Corporation and Walt Disney illustrate why it is desirable to use 
segmented revenues reflecting only media operations within the United States. Unfortunately, 
the Compustat database of revenue data for the years 1950—1975 does not segment revenues by 
either operating or geographic segments.  For these years, total revenue for each company is 
provided, without any breakdown by operations or countries.  As a result, it is difficult to 
measure the market structure of the media industry for the 1950—1975 timeframe as accurately 
as for the years beyond 1975.  Several variations of the OLS model will be used that adjust the 
market shares for those companies (heretofore known as “conglomerates”) with significant non-
media or foreign media revenues during the 1950—1975 period.  These variations, and the 
reasoning for employing them, will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
Using the company revenues from the Compustat database, market shares for each 
individual company will be calculated in order to determine the HHI and the CR4 and CR8 
indices.  The basis for measuring market structure, therefore, is each company’s revenue 




B. Independent Variables: Measuring Innovation 
 As previously argued, this study hypothesizes that the pattern of adoption of an 
innovation is more critical than the introduction of the innovation itself when attempting to 
measure the impact of the innovation on market structure.  Accordingly, this study measures the 
adoption rates for each of the three technological innovations examined (television, cable 
television, and the Internet). 
1. Measurement Instrument. For each technological innovation examined, the rate of 
adoption is measured by annual change in the percentage of U.S. households utilizing that 
particular medium.  Other statistics, such as sales based measures, provide some insight into the 
diffusion of these technologies throughout the general public, but are less robust for representing 
the actual adoption rate.  For example, relying on the number of televisions sold in a given year 
may show the popularity of television, but does not necessarily provide an accurate indication of 
if and how television is broadening its reach to more people.  New television sales could be 
generated by current television owners, choosing to buy a second or third television.  In such a 
case, an increase in television sales doesn’t necessarily expose more people to the technology, 
whereas adoption by a new household does. Therefore, a household-based measure of adoption 
is a more appropriate basis for measurement for purposes of this study. As such, using the 
percentage of households with televisions provides a more meaningful method of measuring the 
adoption of television for purposes of this study. 
2. Data Collection.  Data detailing the adoption rate of both television and cable 
television for the years 1950—2009—as measured by the penetration into U.S. households—is 
available from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (heretofore referred to as “The 
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Abstract”).  The Abstract is published annually by the United States Census Bureau.5 The 
Abstract is a self-described “comprehensive summary of statistics on the social, political, and 
economic organization of the United States” (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/).  In 
addition to information generated by the Census Bureau, The Abstract includes data from other 
sources including the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 For information regarding the adoption of the Internet, the Census Bureau has released 
annual data indicating the percentage of households with access to the Internet.  However, the 
Census Bureau did not begin collecting this information until 1997; by then already 18% of 
households were reported as having access to the Internet.  Moreover, the Census Bureau has 
also not reported any household Internet access figures beyond 2009. Accordingly, using Census 
Bureau data would limit the number of data points (i.e., years) that could be used for this study, 
and would not provide important information as to the adoption rate of early adopters in the 
years preceding 1997. 
 Two other sources are also available for the rate of Internet adoption.  Pew Research 
Center has tracked the percentage of U.S. adults using the Internet for the period of 1995-2012 
(Pew Research Center, 2012).  In addition, The World Bank has released data showing Internet 
users as a percentage of the population in the United States, from 1990 through 2009 (The World 
Bank, 2012).  For this study, the World Bank data will be used as it is the only data source which 
provides uninterrupted figures annually; the other two sources have periodic skips where data is 
not reported for a particular year. 
 Appendix C presents adoption rates on a year-to-year basis for television, cable 
television, and the Internet.  Where there is no adoption rate for an innovation in a given year, it 
                                                          
5 The Census Bureau has announced that the Statistical Abstract will no longer be published annually after 2011. 
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can be assumed that the innovation had not yet been introduced to the public, and will not be 
included in any analysis. 
C. Control Variables:  Regulation and Economic Influences 
 Other variables may be likely to affect changes in market structure.  As such, two control 
variables are included in the models; namely, a variable to reflect regulatory influences, and a 
second variable reflecting economic influences.   
 1. Regulatory Influences.  Cleavage theory advocates the idea that political parties’ 
positions “reflect divisions in the social structure and the ideologies that provoke and express 
those group divisions” (p. 585, Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002). Marks, et al. have shown that a 
party’s position on a new or emerging issue is strongly influenced by the party’s general 
ideological positions.  This concept can be extended to argue that a party’s general philosophical 
position could be a predictor of that party’s regulatory approach when serving as a governing 
party (Coate, 2002).  As such, this model controls for the expectation that regulatory policies of a 
Republican administration will differ than those of a “non-Republican” administration.  This 
expectation is based on the reality that a presidential administration enacts and enforces its 
regulatory policies through the appointment of cabinet and agency heads (e.g., Department of 
Justice, FCC, FTC) empowered with regulating the media industry.  For this study, a control 
variable—Regulatory Climate—will be operationalized as a dummy variable, indicating a 
Republican administration (i.e., value of ‘1’) or a non-Republican administration (i.e., value of 
‘0’).  Appendix D provides the values of this dummy variable for each year during the 1950—
2009 timeframe. 
The differences between a Republican and non-Republican administration may have an 
effect on the business climate in general, and the market structure of an industry specifically.  
Generally, Republican Party policy has been characterized as a pro-business, deregulatory 
55 
 
focused policy (Shenk, 1995).  This laissez-faire approach manifests itself in many ways, 
including the calls for limiting restrictions on how and when businesses may grow and expand.  
Such an approach would tend to be less interested in actively limiting the market strength of a 
particular company, and therefore it is considered that Republican regulatory policies would 
create an environment conducive to the accumulation of market power among a few large and 
powerful corporations.   
Conversely, Democratic Party policy is characterized as pro-consumer oriented.  Such an 
orientation is in part based on the idea that using regulatory policy to expand competition and 
limit an individual company’s market power is desirable for consumers.  It is anticipated that the 
regulatory environment under a Republican administration will lead to a concentrated media 
market structure (i.e., increasing HHI). 
 2. Economic Influences.  Inasmuch as this study incorporates economic concepts in 
order to measure the media industry, it is reasonable to assume that general economic trends may 
also influence an industry and its market structure.  The GDP, as defined by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, is “the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the 
United States” (Bureau of Economic Statistics, 2012). The GDP is commonly used as a 
measurement of the condition of a nation’s economy (Abramowitz, 2008; Chamberlin, 2011). 
Comparisons of the GDP from year-to-year provide measurement of the growth or contraction of 
the economy.  GDP figures for each year are released by the U.S. Department of Commerce; 
these figures will be used in this study as an indication of economic conditions.  
Economic conditions would likely influence individuals and corporations in their 
spending decisions as well as their investment decisions in research and developments.  It would 
be expected that both of these decisions would impact the expansion or contraction of the media 
industry, and therefore its market structure.  Specifically, it is anticipated that increases in GDP 
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will result in decreases in ownership concentration of the media industry as measured by HHI. 
Appendix D provides the values of this dummy variable for each year during the 1950—2009 
timeframe. 
D. Measuring the Relationship between Innovation and Market Structure 
This study relies on multivariate analysis to determine the presence and nature of a causal 
relationship between each of the independent variables and the market structure of the media 
industry. 
1. Data Structure and Analysis.  Because the data and relationship of interest involve 
change over time, it is important to consider the use of time series analysis to determine the 
extent to which the dependent variable is influenced by previous values of itself as well as other 
variables.   
 Time series analysis techniques are important when analyzing trends in data that report 
values of a particular variable (or variables) over a period of time (Stock & Watson, 1988).  In 
such a situation, it is likely that the dependent variable is influenced in part by previous values of 
itself.  In a linear regression analysis this measure of influence would not be accounted for, and 
would result in the error term for a particular time being correlated with the error terms of 
previous and subsequent times (Maddala, 1988). The error terms, therefore, would be 
autocorrellated; time series analysis helps to identify and measure the component of the error 
term specifically related to the longitudinal nature of the data and to address any autocorrelation 
issues. 
 The review of the previous literature presented in Chapter Two clearly supports the idea 
that the adoption of an innovation generally occurs over a period of time.  As such, it is possible 
that measuring the effect of such adoption on any variable such as market structure may need to 
be analyzed over a period of time.  Some researchers specifically examining the relationship 
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between innovation and the media market structure have utilized such an approach (Dowd, 
2004).   
Even researchers studying this relationship that have not relied on time series analysis 
nonetheless acknowledge its relevance, as evidenced by Peterson and Berger (1996), who argued 
that “Future studies that use regression models to test the relationship between concentration and 
innovation . . . will need to be sensitive to the assumptions underlying the methods of time-
ordered analysis of historical processes” (p. 177). 
 To determine whether or not time series analysis is the appropriate methodology for this 
study, the Box Jenkins approach was employed, which helps identify and estimate time-series 
models (Enders, 2004). Box Jenkins diagnostics help determine whether or not a prior value of 
the dependent variable influences and predicts future variables.  The Box Jenkins approach 
recognizes three components to a time-series model: an autoregressive component, a moving 
average component, and an integrated component.  A time series relationship may have any or 
all of these components.  The Box Jenkins methodology helps to determine the presence of each 
of these components which, combined, are represented in an ARIMA model.6  Each component 
will be explained, and results indicating the presence or absence of each will be discussed. 
Initially, tests for integration (the ‘I’ of the ARIMA model) of each variable were 
conducted. An Integrated variable, by definition, violates key assumptions of time-series data. 
Those assumptions are: 
1) The variable has a constant mean, 
2) The variable has a constant variance, and 
3) The effect of a prior observation on future observations is a decaying one. 
                                                          
6 When using the Box Jenkins method for analyzing variables, the “AR” and “MA” components are tested only for 
the dependent variable. 
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  Further, an integrated variable is considered to be influenced by its previous observation, 
but purely randomly.  Integrated variables, by definition, are considered to have unit roots, so the 
effect of a prior value of that variable on its current value never diminishes.  To test for 
integration, two tests—the augmented Dickey Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test—were 
applied to the dependent variable and each independent variable individually.   Each allows for 
testing a null hypothesis that the variable does has a unit root.    
Table 1 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller test, while Table 2 presents the results of 
the Phillips-Perron test. Results of both tests lead to the conclusion that the null hypothesis can 
only be rejected for the “TV-Adoption” variable.  In other words, it is assumed that unit roots 
exist for “Market Structure,” “Cable-Adoption,” and “Internet-Adoption” variables.  In the case 
of “Market Structure,” the Phillips-Perron test does indicate that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected, but only at the p<.10 level.  Given the results of the Dickey-Fuller test and the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis at the p<.05 and p<.01, it is assumed that a unit root exists for the 
“Market Structure” variable. 
Table 1.  Results, Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. 















-2.470 -3.562 -2.923 -2.596 0.123 
TV 
Adoption 
-16.524 -3.569 -2.924 -2.597 0.0000 
Cable TV 
Adoption 
-0.603 -3.576 -2.928 -2.599 0.8702 
Internet 
Adoption 




Table 2. Results, Phillips-Perron Test. 
 















-2.697 -3.567 -2.923 -2.596 0.0745 
TV 
Adoption 
-28.662 -3.569 -2.924 -2.597 0.0000 
Cable TV 
Adoption 
-0.629 -3.576 -2.928 -2.599 0.8644 
Internet 
Adoption 
-0.211 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 0.9372 
 
Results of the tests for integration on the “TV-Adoption” variable are somewhat 
incongruous with the nature of the data: Rejecting the null hypothesis that “TV-Adoption” has a 
unit root would imply that the trend for “TV-Adoption” is a linear one.  However, as Figure 3 
illustrates, a view of the trend of “TV-Adoption” shows a curvilinear relationship. 
 
Figure 3. Television Adoption Rate. (Adoption rate of television as measured by 


































































































Given the obvious illustration that “TV-Adoption” is not a linear trend, the more 
conservative approach to reconciling the diagnostic results with the graph results is to assume the 
variable is integrated (i.e., has a unit root), and does not have a constant mean or variance.  
Again, Figure 3 supports this approach. 
Having concluded that the variables in this study each contain a unit root, further 
analytics are required in order to determine the most appropriate model for testing the 
hypotheses.  Specifically, each independent variable must be examined to see if it is cointegrated 
with the dependent variable.  Cointegrated variables, by definition, share a unit root and have a 
normally distributed error (Granger, 1981). If two integrated variables do not share a stochastic 
trend (i.e., normally distributed error), then any correlation is deemed to be spurious. 
 To detect such cointegration among these variables the Engle-Granger test is applied to 
each independent variable paired with the dependent variable.  Table 3 presents results of the 
Engle-Granger test as applied to each pair; results support the conclusion that the null hypothesis 
(“The variables are not cointegrated”) can be rejected.  Therefore, it is assumed that each 
independent variable is cointegrated with the dependent variable, and that these relationships are 
not spurious. 
 Because the variables are cointegrated, the equation should not include a time trend as a 
regressed variable (Mocan, 1999).  Without the presence of such a time trend, testing for the 
autoregressive component of the ARIMA model is unnecessary, and it is concluded that p=0, 
where p is the number of lags included in the autoregressive component to allow for the effect of 
any time trend. The same can be concluded with respect to the white noise of the model being 
developed, and therefore moving average components (“MA”) are nonexistent.  In this case, q=0, 
where q is the number of lags in the forecast errors.  Finally, when time series variables are 
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cointegrated, the equation used to test the hypotheses must incorporate the changes in the value 
of the variables. 

























-2.468 -3.833 -3.031 -2.656  
 
In summary, diagnostic tests on the preliminary data revealed no time trend for the 
dependent variable.  Accordingly, this proposed study need not employ time series analysis to 
examine annual changes in media market structures as a function of annual rates of technological 
adoptions.  Instead, it is appropriate to utilize OLS regression of the changes in the studied 






Having determined that OLS regression is the appropriate method for studying the 
research questions, this chapter presents results of regression analyses for different models using 
different assumptions regarding the market shares for the conglomerates for the 1950—1975 
period.  First, Section A reviews the data that was collected in order to measure each of the 
variables identified and defined in Chapter Five. The measurement of market structure—as 
represented by the HHI—is examined more closely in Section B in order to more fully 
understand the trends and evolution of the market structure of the media industry over time.  As 
will be noted in that section, the difficulty with collecting media-only revenue data for the 
1950—1975 period means that the 1976—2009 timeframe will be more closely examined when 
trying to understand the evolution of the media market structure.  
Given the difficulties resulting from the two different data sets used for this study, 
different strategies will be utilized to create a uniform data set that is the best solution for 
combining the two data sets into one set that can be used for the study.  Section C considers 
revenue data from both data sets, without any adjustments to try and estimate media only 
revenues.  Sections D through H employ different approaches to estimate a “media-only” 
revenue scenario.  These approaches are explained in the respective sections.  Finally, Section I 
specifically examines the effect of the adoption rate of the Internet only (i.e., without considering 
the adoption rate of other technological innovations) on the market structure of the media. 
A. Description of Data 
 The data collected for each variable is described in Appendix E with a summary of the 
descriptive statistics for each variable.  Because the three independent variables are designed to 
measure adoption rates for different media, it is appropriate and meaningful to compare the 
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statistics for these variables. Figure 4 illustrates the trends for each of the three independent 
variables.  
 
Figure 4. Adoption Rates by Technology. (Adoption rate of each technological innovation 
examined in this study.  Adoption is measured by the percent of U.S. households that have the 
respective technology, as measured by the U.S. Statistical Abstract for the years 1950—2009. 
 
As noted in Appendix E, it is interesting to note that the number of observations for “TV 
Adoption” and “Cable TV Adoption” are similar (NTV Adoption = 59, NCable TV Adoption= 54), 
indicating that the adoption of these two technologies has occurred over a similar timeframe. 
This is also evident in Figure 4 by the fact that the trend lines for “TV Adoption” and “Cable TV 
Adoption” are similar in terms of the length of time each line measures. However, despite the 
fact that the adoption of television and cable television have occurred over a similar length of 
time, these variables report noticeably different means ( X TV Adoption = 90.2, X Cable TV Adoption = 
33.29), medians (M TV Adoption = 97.7, M Cable TV Adoption = 22.21), and ranges (Range TV Adoption = 



















































































































confirmation that the adoption patterns for television and cable television are different:  The 
public’s adoption of television was much more rapid and pervasive than was the adoption of 
cable television.   
 With regards to cable television adoption, those statistics which differ from television 
adoption appear to be very similar to the respective statistics for Internet adoption, particularly 
the means ( X Cable TV Adoption = 33.29, X Internet Adoption = 38.87) and the ranges (Range Cable TV 
Adoption = min (0.5), max (72.4), Range Internet Adoption = min (0.8), max (29.45).  Such results 
indicate that the adoption pattern for cable television and the Internet may share a similar trend, 
but the pattern for the Internet was accomplished in nearly one-third the timeframe that it took 
for cable television.  Again, this is illustrated in Figure 4, showing that the trends for both “Cable 
TV Adoption” and “Internet Adoption” are characterized by lines forming S-shaped curves, 
although the slopes of each are significantly different. Such findings further support the 
contention by some that the Internet is the fastest growing communications medium (Rooh-e-
Aslam, Ali, & Shabir, 2009).   
B. Identifying Trends in the Evolution of the Market Structure of the Media Industry 
 Having collected revenue data on media companies used in this sample for the years 
1950—2009, Figure 5 shows the trend in the HHI as a measure of media market concentration 
for this timeframe.  Data collected for the years 1950—1975 include all revenues for companies, 




Figure 5. Media Industry Concentration, 1950—2009. (This figure tracks the markeket structure 
of the media industry during the 1950—2009 period.  “Market structure” is defined as 
concentration of ownership as measured by market shares of each media company included in 
the study.  The level of concentration is represented by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
One measure includes all media companies, including conglomerates which reported non-media 
revenue incomes for the years 1950—1974.  The second measure eliminates these companies for 
the entire period. 
 
As such, the measure of concentration for this timeframe may be skewed.  To provide 
some perspective into how much of an effect these companies may have on the HHI 
measurement, a second measurement (“without conglomerates”) is presented that considers the 
market structure of the media industry if these companies are eliminated for the entire timeframe.  
The result shows that both trends are very similar, although the variance from year-to-year is 
greater when including all companies.  Additionally, the impact of these companies is seen by 
the dramatic drop in market concentration from 1975—1976, representing the elimination of 
non-media revenues from one year to the next. 
As shown in Table 4, the results provided by these two different approaches are highly 































































































HHI value, particularly for the 1950—1975 timeframe, it is nevertheless possible to identify 
trends over the entire 60-year period, since the trends are highly correlated.  Indeed, there 
appears to be five distinct trends during this time period, with some phases lasting longer than 
others. 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations:  HHI with and without conglomerates’ 
revenues.         
  With Without 
With  1.0000 0.9510 
Without 0.9510 1.0000 
*Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (two-tailed) 
 
The results indicate an initial trend of a generally steep decline in market concentration 
beginning in 1950 and continuing through the early 1970s.7  For the next few years (until 1976), 
fluctuations in the level of concentration are minimal, and the trend line is generally flat.  By 
1976, the market structure enters another phase of declining concentration which continues until 
1987.8  From 1987 through 2001, the HHI value stabilizes within a 90-point range.  After 2001, 
market concentration begins to increase, and a general upward trend continues throughout the 
remainder of the time period analyzed in this study.  To be sure, the final year—2009—shows a 
noticeable decline.  Whether or not this is the beginning of a new trend or a mere fluctuation 
cannot be determined, but should be examined as subsequent years’ worth of revenue data are 
collected and additional HHI measurements are calculated. 
C. Effect of Technological Adoption on the Market Structure of the Media 
Applying equation 5.1 to the preliminary data for market structure and adoption of 
television and cable television, regression results are presented in Table 5. 
 
                                                          
7 Depending on which trend line used, the declining trends ends in either 1973 or 1974. 
8 When analyzing the trend post-1975, HHI figures which include all companies and all revenues, including 
conglomerates, are used. 
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Table 5. (Model 1) OLS regression estimates for model of  
Media Structure, with unadjusted market shares. 
 
      b t   
Constant 
   
0.038 0.91   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.417 -0.49   
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.102 -0.64   
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] -1.24 -1.57 * 
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
-0.016 -0.48   
  





     
  
N 53 
    
  
R2 0.0714 
    
  
Adjusted R2 -0.006 
    
  
F 0.92 
    
  
Prob > F 0.4584 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient in 
parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
 
This model (“Model 1”) includes all revenues for the companies studied.  This includes 
nine conglomerates which report a significant drop in market share from 1975—the final year of 
unsegmented revenue reporting—to 1976—the first year of segmented revenue reporting. For 
purposes of this study, a decline in market share of 20% or greater was considered “significant,” 
and appropriate for an adjustment in market share data for the first half of the study.  Figure 6 
illustrates the adoption rates of the two media technologies in relation to the trend of the market 
structure of the media, as measured by HHI.  For Figure 6, HHI is based on all companies 
(including conglomerates) and, for the 1950-1975 timeframe, all revenues (including non-media 
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operations of those conglomerates).  This is consistent with the assumptions used for Model 1, 
albeit future models are based on different assumptions regarding the calculation of HHI.   
 
 
Figure 6. Adoption Rates and HHI. (Adoption rate of Television and Cable TV, compared to 
media market structure, as measured by HHI.  Adoption rate is measured by the percent of U.S. 
households that have the respective technology, as measured by the U.S. Statistical Abstract for 
the years 1950—2009.) 
 
Table 6 presents these companies with the market shares for each company in 1975—
based on unsegmented revenues—and in 1976—based on segmented revenues.  For Model 1, no 
adjustments were made to any of these companies, so the revenue data used includes revenues 
from all operations associated with each company. 
The results do not support the conclusion that the model represents a “good fit” in terms 
of explaining the relationship between the causal variables and media market structure (“Prob > 
F” = .4582).  Accordingly, the null hypothesis that this model does not provide a good estimate 
































































































explanatory power (R2 = 0.0714).  Only one control variable—GDP—is shown to be a 
statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable at the p>.10 level (b=-1.24, t=-1.57). 
Table 6. Companies with significant declines in market share when data 
source changes. 
  
1975            
Market Share 
1976                
Market Share 
% Change in 
Market Share 
Cadence Industries 0.469 0.326 30.49 
Chris-Craft 0.326 0.134 58.90 
Cinerama 0.387 0.028 92.76 
Disney 2.77 0.827 70.14 
Harcourt General 1.91 1.17 38.74 
Journal Communications 1.23 0.69 43.90 
MacMillan 2.54 1.3 48.82 
Post Corp 0.112 0.059 47.32 
RCA 25.53 5.76 77.44 
Total 35.274 10.294 ---- 
 
The model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP will result in a 1.24-
unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry.  None of the 
remaining variables are shown to be statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable. 
D. Removing companies with non-media revenues from consideration in the model 
 For the nine conglomerates, the change in their respective market shares decreases by 
over 20% from the year 1975 (the last year that unsegmented revenues are reported) to the year 
1976 (the first year that segmented revenues are reported, allowing for an examination 
specifically of media-only revenues).   While it is possible that companies may show revenue 
declines over any given one-year period, the large declines are explained to some degree because 
these companies were diversified conglomerates, with non-media operations generating 
significant revenues during the 1950-1975 period.   
RCA, for example, was a leader in the consumer electronics industry and not just in the 
media industry through its NBC Radio and NBC Television operations.  The impact of these 
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non-media revenues on the analysis of the market structure for the 1950—1975 period could be 
significant.  As Table 6 shows, the combined market share in 1975 for these nine conglomerates 
totaled 35.27%; the following year—when media-only revenues are analyzed—these nine 
companies only represented 10.29% of the market.  Put another way, the data suggest that non-
media revenues for RCA during the 1950—1975 period of analysis could be as much as 25% of 
all the revenues analyzed in Model 1.9  
There are several options that could be considered for minimizing the impact that the 
non-media revenues from these nine conglomerates might have on this study. The first option is 
to completely eliminate these companies from analysis during the 1950—1975 time frame.  Such 
an adjustment would obviously impact the measure of annual concentration for the media 
industry (i.e., HHI) and the regression estimates for the model of the Structure of the Media.  The 
regression results for this model (“Model 2”) are presented in Table 7. 
The results indicate that this model is a good fit estimate for explaining the relationship between 
the causal variables and the change in media market structure (“Prob > F” = .0291; “Prob >F” < 
.05).  This model offers a moderate level of explanatory power (R2 =.1977), and includes two 
variables that are statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable.  The first variable, 
as in the first model studied, is the economic climate variable, as reflected by annual changes in 
GDP (b=-1.2, t=-2.32).  Here, the model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP 
will result in a 1.2-unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media market 
structure.  In addition, this model shows one technological adoption variable to be a statistically 
significant predictor of the dependent variable: The model indicates that a change in the adoption 
rate of television as a new medium predicts a change in the media market structure (b=-.755, t=-
                                                          
9 In other words, the difference between the 1975 market share and the 1976 market share (35.27-10.29 = 24.98). 
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1.35).  Specifically, a one-unit increase in the adoption of television predicts a .755-unit decrease 
in the concentration of the media market structure.      
Table 7.  (Model 2).OLS regression estimates for model of Media 
Structure, with nine companies eliminated for 1950-1975 period. 
        b t   
Constant 
   
0.03 1.1   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.76 -1.35 * 
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.1 -0.95   
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] -1.2 -2.32 ** 
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.01 0.59   
  





     
  
N 53 
    
  
R2 0.1977 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.1308 
    
  
F 2.96 
    
  
Prob > F 0.0291 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient 
in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
 
E. Removing RCA from consideration in the model 
 Returning to  Table 6, a closer examination of the nine conglomerates with significant 
non-media operations shows that one company in particular—RCA Corporation—more than any 
other company is a major contributor of “non-media” revenue to this study during the 1950-1975 
time period.  Indeed, the difference between RCA’s market share in 1975 and 1976 shows a 
difference of 19.77%, indicating that almost 20% of the entire “media market” analyzed in 1975 
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was associated with non-media revenues solely generated by RCA.   In comparison, the 
difference between the 1975 and 1976 market shares of the remaining eight companies combined 
only represents 5.21% of the entire market analyzed.  This is still a significant number, but given 
the size of its market share, RCA could be viewed as an outlier by itself.  As such, another 
alternative to analyzing the relationship between the independent variables and the media market 
structure is to remove only RCA from the study for the years where the non-media revenue 
cannot be identified and eliminated.  Using this approach, results of the regression analysis are 
presented in Table 8. 
Adjusting the market share data by removing RCA revenues does not result in an OLS 
regression model that provides a “good fit” estimate of media market structure (“Prob > F”= 
.1017).  Moreover, the explanatory power of this model is weak (R2 = .1461).   
As with the previous two models, the “economic climate” variable, reflecting the annual 
change in GDP, is a statistically significant predictor of change in the media market structure 
(b=-0.795, t=-1.59).  The model predicts that a one-unit increase in GDP change will result in a 
.795-unit decrease in change in the media market structure.  For this model, the economic 
climate variable is the only causal variable that is statistically significant. 
F. Revising Market Shares 
 Including all revenues from the nine conglomerates in this study (i.e., Model 1) may 
result in a skewed measure of market structure that indicates more concentration than there really 
is, excluding all revenues from these conglomerates (i.e., Model 3) may also result in skewed 
results.  Excluding all revenues for the 1950—1975 period means that media revenues are 
excluded as well, and the measure of media market structure could theoretically indicate more or 




Table 8. (Model 3). OLS regression estimates for model of Media 
Structure, with RCA eliminated for 1950-1975 period. 
        b t   
Constant 
   
0.015 0.55   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.48 -0.88   
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.11 -1.08   
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] -0.8 -1.59 * 
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.02 0.99   
  





     
  
N 53 
    
  
R2 0.1461 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.075 
    
  
F 2.05 
    
  
Prob > F 0.1017 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient 
in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
 
Another alternative is to include these conglomerates in the study, but to adjust their 
market shares in a way that more accurately reflects a measurement of media-only revenues.  
One way to do this is to determine an “average” market share for each of the nine conglomerates, 
and apply this average market share for the years 1950—1975 in lieu of using a market share 
based on the conglomerate’s total revenues (non-media included).   
For this approach, an average market share for each company was calculated by 
averaging each conglomerate’s annual market share over the 1976-2009 period.  This average 
was then used as an estimate of the company’s market share for each year over the 1950—1975 
74 
 
period.  The average market share to be used for each company is presented in Table 9. The table 
shows that, for example, Cadence Industries’ market share of the media industry averaged .3% 
during the 1976-2009 period.  This number will be used to reflect the company’s market share 
during the 1950-1975 period in order to calculate a measure of market structure (HHI) for the 
media industry over the entire period of study.  









Harcourt General 0.86 
Journal Communications 0.3 
MacMillan 0.8 
Post Corp 0.08 
RCA 5.76 
 
Having determined a measure of market structure with these assumed market shares, an 
OLS regression analysis produced results detailed in Table 10 (“Model 4”). 
The model does not necessarily represent the best fit as an explanation into the 
relationship between the causal variables and the dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .0573). The 
model also offers limited explanatory power with respect to identifying and explaining those 
agents of influence on changes in the market structure of the media industry (R2 = .1705).   
The model, however, does suggest two causal variables that are statistically significant 
predictors of changes in the market structure of the media industry; namely, changes in the 
adoption of television (b=-.685, t=-1.35), and changes in GDP (b=-.757, t=-1.61).  The model 



















in a .685-unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry.  Further, 
the model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP will result in a .757-unit 
decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry. 
G. Considering Trends When Revising Market Shares 
 Model 4 attempts to provide a realistic estimate of the media-only market shares for the 
nine conglomerates in this study, but this approach assumes that there is no fluctuation in the 
market shares of these companies throughout the 1950-1975 timeframe.  It is likely that each 
company’s market share will fluctuate from year-to-year.  To allow for these fluctuations, a final 
Table 10. (Model 4).OLS regression estimates for model of 
Media Structure, with estimated market shares for 1950-1975 
period for nine conglomerates.  
        b t   
Constant       0.015 0.60   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.685 -1.35   
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.096 -1.00 * 
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] -0.757 -1.61 * 
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.020 1.02   
  





     
  
N 53 
    
  
R2 0.1705 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.1014 
    
  
F 2.47 
    
  
Prob > F 0.0573 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective 
coefficient in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
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model with adjustments to conglomerate revenues will be considered in order to analyze the 
effect that changes in the adoption rate of television and changes in the adoption rate of cable 
television have on the dependent variable.   
This model begins with an assumption that market shares for 1975 (the last year of 
unsegmented revenues) are the same as the company’s market share for 1976 (the first year of 
segmented revenues).  The model then assumes that actual changes in a conglomerate’s market 
share during the 1950-1975 period is similar to the changes in that company’s market share for 
revenues specific to the media industry.  In other words, if unsegmented (i.e., total) revenues for 
RCA increased 4% from 1974 to 1975, then it is assumed that RCA media revenues also 
increased by 4% during that timeframe.  With this assumption, RCA’s 1974 media segment 
market share can be calculated based on the estimated 1975 market share.  These assumptions 
produce market shares that are consistent with market shares generated from the segmented data 
for the years 1976—2009, but also consistent with the year-to-year fluctuations in the company’s 
revenues for the years 1950-1975.  Using these estimates of market shares for the nine 
companies, an OLS regression generates results detailed in Table 11 (“Model 5”). 
The results indicate that this model is not a good fit for explaining the relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variables (“Prob > F” = .0735).  As with 
prior models, this model offers minimal explanatory power (R2 = .1601), and only one causal 
variable—change in GDP—is found to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent 
variable (b=7.779, t=-1.65). It is interesting to note that this variable is the only one that has 






Table 11. (Model 5). OLS regression estimates for model of Media 
Structure, with estimated market shares and trends for 1950-1975 
period for nine conglomerates. 
        b t   
Constant 
   
0.016 0.63   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.535 -1.05   
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.110 -1.14   
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]  -0.779 -1.65 * 
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.019 0.94   
  





     
  
N 53 
    
  
R2 0.1601 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.0901 
    
  
F 2.29 
    
  
Prob > F 0.0735 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient 
in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
  
H. Considering Segmented Revenues Only 
 The results presented thus far have all included revenues for the entire 1950—2009 
timeframe.  However, recognizing that the data for the first 26 years cannot provide media-only 
revenues, each scenario reflects a different approach to try and use these 26 years in the analysis.  
Another option, however, is to completely eliminate these years entirely from the analysis—not 
just revenues from the nine conglomerates, but from all companies—and only examine 1976—
2009; the years where segmented revenues are available.   
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One disadvantage to this approach is the fewer number of observations available for 
inclusion in the model. In this case, N = 32, whereas the other models are based on N = 53.  
However, if this model proves to be the most theoretically and empirically sound model, this 
disadvantage could eventually go away; going forward, a new observation will be added each 
year, as publicly traded companies currently continue to report segmented revenues on in their 
annual reports.  As such, the number of observations (i.e., N) will increase, and as this sample 
size increases, eventually to an acceptable and desired number of observations. 
Despite the limited number of observations, this model offers the benefit of examining 
strictly media-related revenues, and the model does so without having to make estimates based 
on assumptions that are likely to be unrealistic throughout the entire 1950—1975 period. 
 Results of this model (“Model 6”) are presented in Table 12.  Unfortunately, the model 
does not appear to be a best fit estimate of the relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variables (“Prob > F” = .346).  As with prior models, the explanatory power is 
minimal; the model only explains approximately 15% of the variance between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable (R2 =.1478).   
Only one variable is shown to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent 
variable.  Interestingly, for the first time, the “Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate” variable is 
shown to be statistically significant (b=-.355, t=-1.89).  The model predicts that a one-unit 
increase in the change of the adoption rate of Cable TV will result in a .355-unit decrease in the 
change of media market structure.  The results are interesting in that the change in the adoption 
rate of TV is no longer a statistically significant predictor, but change in the adoption rate of 





Table 12. (Model 6). OLS regression estimates for model of  
Media Structure, 1976-2009. 
        b t   
Constant 
   
0.021 0.59   
  




Change in Television Adoption Rate [-] -0.943 -0.04   
  




Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-] -0.355 -1.89 ** 
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] -0.479 -0.63   
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.022 0.77   
  





     
  
N 32 
    
  
R2 0.1478 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.022 
    
  
F 1.17 
    
  
Prob > F 0.346 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient 
in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  
*prob. < .10        
 
I. Effect of the Internet on Media Market Structure 
 Chapter Four presented a strong argument for considering the Internet as a technology 
capable of influencing the market structure of the media industry.  However, none of the models 
discussed in this study have yet to incorporate the adoption rate of this medium.  This is because 
including Internet adoption in the previously presented models would result in fewer 
observations for all variables that would be considered in the models.   
Since the Internet is still a relatively new medium that has nevertheless shown rapid 
growth in terms of overall adoption, there is a short time period that incorporates the adoption 
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pattern of the Internet by the general population.  As a result, there are few observations or data 
points that show adoption levels for this medium.  Indeed, this study shows only a twenty-year 
timeframe of Internet adoption, for a total of 19 observations.  It is, therefore, prudent to examine 
this medium separately.  It is also prudent to recognize that any conclusions suggested by an 
“Internet-only” model are conditional at best; as the timeframe of consumers’ adoption of the 
Internet expands, more observations can be captured and included in the model, which may 
increase its validity and predictive strength. 
 Results of the “Internet-only” model are presented in Table 13, and reaffirm the 
incomplete nature of the data.  With only 19 data points, the results indicate that the model is not 
a good fit estimate of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable (“Prob > F” = .192).  Further, none of the independent variables in the model are 
statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable.  Interestingly, out of all the models 
studied, this model indicates the highest explanatory power (R2 = .2638), although such a finding 




Table 13. (Model 7). OLS regression estimates for model of Media 
Structure with Internet adoption as causal variable. 
        b t   
Constant 
   
-0.059 -1.19   
  




Change in Internet Adoption Rate [-] -0.011 -0.11   
  




Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-] 1.144 1.14   
  




Regulatory Climate [+] 
  
0.085 1.93   
  





     
  
N 19 
    
  
R2 0.2638 
    
  
Adjusted R2 0.1165 
    
  
F 1.79 
    
  
Prob > F 0.192 
    
  
  
     
  
Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors. 
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient 
in parentheses. 
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient. 
****prob. <.001 
***prob. <.01 
     
  
**prob. <.05 
     
  





Discussion of Results 
 One of the objectives of this study has been to develop a model that can be used to 
examine the market structure of the media industry as a whole and explain the changes in the 
structure as measured by concentration of ownership.  As discussed in Chapter Two, previous 
studies have established an empirical foundation for the idea that one influencing agent of an 
industry’s market structure is technological innovation.  Moreover, researchers have studied this 
effect of technological innovation specifically on the media industry, although these studies have 
focused on individual segments of the media industry, and not by looking at the media as a 
whole.   
The idea to build upon this body of work in order to examine the relationship between 
technological innovation and the market structure of the media industry as a whole is particularly 
important now.  This is because of the increasing convergence of the media industry, and the 
potential concentration of market power that could result from this convergence and 
consolidation.  Because this convergence trend is still relatively young, the need for a “first 
attempt” to develop a model explaining the market structure of the media as a whole is timely.  
Certainly, any such “first attempt” should benefit from future examination and revision.  The 
results of this study, which offers such a “first attempt,” will benefit from such future 
examination and revision. Nevertheless, it still offers a positive first step in many respects.  
The study has proposed a model that recognizes the potential influence that technological 
innovation, general economic conditions, and governmental regulatory policy could have on the 
market structure of the media.  Chapter Six shows the model leads to inconclusive findings. 
Empirical analysis does not conclusively support the idea that radical innovation influences the 
market structure of the media industry.  The inconclusive findings may be the result of a flawed 
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hypothesis as to the nature of the relationship between innovation and media market structure.  
Conversely, it is also possible that the inconclusive findings suggest problems with the 
construction and operationalization of the variables used to study this relationship.  Indeed, this 
study provides clues as to how the model could be improved to provide the best level of 
explanatory and predictive power desired.  All of the models studying changes in the adoption 
rate of television and changes in the adoption rate of cable television are reviewed and 
summarized in Section A.  This review includes a discussion of each variable studied.  Rather 
than presenting the models in the order in which they were discussed in Chapter Six, they are 
presented in an order that highlights those models that offer the most explanatory power.   
In addition to offering an adequate level of explanatory power, any model should also be 
strongly grounded in a solid theoretical framework. Section B discusses the theoretical strength 
of the models examined in Section A, adding to the explanatory power examined in that section.  
 Section C then examines these models to determine which ones overall (i.e., both 
empirically and theoretically) best explain the causal influences of changes in media market 
structure.  Having identified which model(s) best illustrate the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, Section C also explores these “best” models to 
test this study’s hypotheses, as presented in Chapter Four, with the idea of identifying which of 
the models the hypotheses proposed in that chapter are supported..  For Sections A-C, the first 
six models reported in Chapter Six will be discussed.  These models consider, as independent 
variables, both the change in the adoption rate of television as well as the change in the adoption 
rate of cable television.  The last model—which considers Internet adoption as a causal variable 
will be discussed separately in Section D.  
The final two sections look beyond the scope of this study. Section E considers future 
research initiatives directly related to the model of choice proposed in Section B, specifically 
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considering ways in which the model can provide greater explanatory and predictive power.  
Section F looks beyond this model to consider other relevant questions related to media market 
structure. 
A. Assessing Trends in Media Market Structure 
Chapter Seven provided evidence that the market structure of the media industry has 
experienced different phases and different trends. These results, therefore, show that the media 
industry has not been plagued with a constant trend of increasing concentration and diminishing 
competition.  Likewise, the industry has not always been characterized by consistent period of 
increasing competition.  Such changes in the direction of the trend reaffirm the importance of 
identifying those variables that can act as a catalyst for these changes and influence both the 
direction and magnitude of any trends in the market structure of the media industry. 
In addition, the results in Chapter Seven indicate that for almost the entire time period of 
this study, the market structure of the media has been below the 1500-point level that is 
considered to be “moderately concentrated,” and within the range that is considered to be 
“unconcentrated.”  In other words, when viewing the “media as a whole,” the media industry is 
generally characterized by unconcentrated and diverse ownership.  Indeed, some points in time 
during the early years of this study’s timeframe indicate a market structure that is “moderately 
concentrated.”  However, these are generally when including the non-media revenues generated 
by conglomerates with media operations.  Even when including these revenues, the media 
industry is considered “unconcentrated” as far back as 1963 and remains as such throughout the 
remainder of the study. 
B. Assessing Empirical Strengths of the Models 
 Of the five models considered, only one—Model 2—offers a best fit estimate of the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (“Prob “F” = .0291, F 
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= 2.96).  One other—Model 4—approaches a level consistent with being a best fit estimate 
(“Prob “F” = .0573, F = 2.47).   
Model 2 eliminates the nine conglomerates from consideration in the years 1950-1975 by 
assuming market shares of 0%.  Not only does this model offer the best fit estimate out of all 
models considered; it also finds two of the four causal variables to be statistically significant 
predictors of the market structure of the media industry.  First, the model gives some support to 
the idea that technological innovation influences the market structure of the media by showing 
change in the adoption rate of television to be a statistically significant predictor of changes in 
media market structure (b=-.755, t=-1.35, p<.10).  In addition, the general economic climate as 
reflected by changes in GDP also are a statistically significant predictor of changes in media 
market structure (b=-1.2, t=-2.32, p<.05.).  In this model, neither the change in Cable TV 
adoption rate nor the regulatory climate as represented by the political party in power is a 
statistically significant independent variable.   
The other model that comes close to generating a best fit estimate—Model 4—addresses 
market shares for each of the nine conglomerates by assuming a market share during 1950—
1975 timeframe that is equal to its average market share during the 1976—2009 timeframe.  This 
model also finds two causal variables to be statistically significant predictors of media market 
share.  As with the prior model, change in economic conditions (GDP) is a statistically 
significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=-.757, t=-1.61, p<.10).  However, 
this model also indicates that change in the adoption rate of cable television is a statistically 
significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=-.096, t=-1.00, p<.10).  Neither of 
the other two hypothesized causal variables—change in the adoption rate of television, or 
regulatory environment—is shown to be statistically significant. 
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 Two additional models offer some empirical power, as each reports one variable that is 
statistically significant and each approaches a level consistent with being a best fit estimate.  
Each of these models incorporates the unsegmented revenue data for the years 1950-1975; 
however, the market shares associated with the nine conglomerates are treated differently.   
In one case—Model 5, results of which are reported in Table 11—market shares are 
estimated based on the market shares for the years with segmented revenues (i.e., 1975—2009) 
and based on a trend during the 1950—2009 timeframe.  This model is not a best fit estimate 
although it approaches that distinction (“Prob > F” = .0735).  The second model—Model 3—
adjusts the market share only for RCA by eliminating the company from consideration during the 
1950—1975 timeframe.  In this case, the model, while approaching a level consistent with a best 
fit model (“Prob > F” = .1017), does not reach the desired level.   
For Model 4 and Model 5, only one variable—change in economic condition (GDP)—is 
statistically significant.  Neither of the variables specifically indicating technological innovation 
as measured by adoption rates for new technologies is statistically significant.  As in the case of 
all of the other two models reviewed, regulatory environment is not a statistically significant 
predictor of the dependent variable. 
 Finally, two of the models examined seem to offer little if any empirical support for the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  For each of these 
models, one causal variable is found to be significant, but neither is a best fit estimate of the 
relationship between all of the independent variables and the dependent variable.  In one 
model—Model 1—revenues for all media companies are included, and no adjustment is made 
for the conglomerates during the 1950—1975 period.  As a result, non-media revenues are 
included in calculating market shares, which leads to skewed measurements of annual market 
concentration (i.e., HHI).  In this model—results of which are illustrated in Table 4—one causal 
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variable, change in economic conditions (GDP), is statistically significant ((b=-1.24, t=-1.57, p 
<.10). The F-statistic clearly indicates that this model is not the best estimate of the relationship 
which is being studied (“Prob > F” = .4584).   
The remaining model—Model 6—considers media-only revenues from all companies in 
the study.  As a result, the sample size is smaller.  In this case, the change in the adoption rate of 
cable television is a statistically significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=-
.355, t=-1.89, p < .05), but, as with Model 1, the F-statistic indicates Model 6 is not the best fit 
estimate of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (“Prob > F” = 
0.346).   
 Overall, the varying levels of empirical strength of each of the models supports the idea 
that as of yet, the strongest model to explain changes in media market structure has not been 
determined.  However, each of the two primary independent variables—change in adoption of 
television, and change in adoption of cable television—are shown to be statistically significant 
predictors in one of the two most empirically sound models respectively.  It is not possible to 
absolutely conclude that both variables would be statistically significant in any ideal model, but 
the results at a minimum provide empirical evidence to justify considering both of these 
variables.  As will be discussed further in Section H, future attempts to revise, modify and 
strengthen any of these models should continue to include both of these variables. 
 Regarding the control variables, the empirical findings provide clear and strong support 
for the idea that changes in economic conditions as measured by GDP is a statistically significant 
predictor of changes in media market structure.  Only one model—that with the smallest sample 
size—did not show this control variable to be statistically significant.  The impact of this finding 
as it relates to hypothesis testing will be discussed further in Section F, and the implication for 
future studies will be discussed further in Section H.  The remaining control variable, which 
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measured the impact of the general regulatory climate on changes in the market structure of the 
media, was not shown to be a statistically significant predictor in any of the models.  Such a 
consistent finding could lead to a conclusion that regulation does not impact the market structure 
of the media.  This will be discussed further in Section G.    
C. Assessing Theoretical Strengths of the Models 
 Because of the challenges resulting from the different methodologies used to calculate the 
data that was used for this study, the models are based on different theoretical assumptions as to 
how best to determine measurements of annual market structure of the media industry.  While 
Section A compares the different models from an empirical perspective to evaluate the relative 
strengths of each, any evaluation of all the models should also include an assessment of which 
models are grounded in the strongest theoretical assumptions, or which models avoid weaker 
assumptions. 
 Because Model 6 relies on media-only revenue data, there are no adjustments made to 
any of the data.  As such, it can be argued that the results are the purest in terms of not being 
skewed by extraneous revenues, or by any adjustments used in order to minimize or eliminate the 
effect of those extraneous revenues.  One of the main weaknesses of this model is the small 
sample size (N=32), but this weakness can (and should) eventually be overcome in future studies 
by adding additional observations, or in this case, additional years of HHI values based on 
subsequent segmented revenue data.  Indeed, this model has, as one of its inherent strengths, the 
characteristic that its main limitation of a small sample size is probably the easiest in which to 
address and overcome.  It is this model that found changes in adoption of cable television to be a 
statistically significant predictor of change in media market structure. 
 Of the remaining models, which must all deal with the problematic nature of combining 
segmented and unsegmented revenue data, Model 5 seems to offer the most realistic approach to 
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addressing the problem of the unsegmented data.  This model doesn’t ignore the problem (as 
does Model 1), nor does this model completely ignore selected media companies from 
consideration for any year or years (as do Models 2 and 3).  Rather, it estimates market shares for 
nine conglomerates during the years 1950—1975. In doing so, Model 5 recognizes that these 
market shares would fluctuate, unlike Model 4, which assume market shares remain constant 
year-to-year.  Further, the fluctuations that are assumed are based on the actual fluctuations from 
year-to-year for each company, when all consolidated revenues are used to measure each 
company’s market share.  The model, therefore, relies on assumptions that are grounded in the 
strongest theoretical foundation for explaining how and why the adjustments were made in order 
to address the issue of revenues generated by non-media operations for these nine conglomerates.   
In Model 5, as with Model 6 which offers the strongest theoretical foundation of support, 
the variable measuring change in the adoption rate of cable television was found to be a 
statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable (b=-.096, t=-1.00, p <.10).  
Additionally, changes in economic conditions (GDP) were also statistically significant (b=-7.57, 
t=-1.61, p<.10) which is contrary to the findings in Model 6, but consistent with the findings in 
all of the other models that tested for the effect of changes in the adoption rates of both television 
and cable television. 
 Combined, these two models offer a compelling argument that changes in adoption rate 
of cable television, as an example of technological innovation, does influence the changes in the 
market structure of the media industry. 
 As stated earlier in this section, the remaining models, while seeking to provide different 
perspectives on how the issue of unsegmented revenues should be address, nevertheless 
approach this issue with assumptions that are less realistic and less likely, and therefore do not 
offer the same theoretical foundation as offered by Models 5 and 6. 
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D. Identifying the Model(s)-of-Choice 
 In Section A, two models were identified as those which offered the strongest empirical 
justification as the model-of-choice for explaining the causes of changes in media market 
structure.  Similarly, Section B identified two models with the strongest theoretical support for 
being the best model to explain the causes of these changes.  No single model is judged to be a 
model-of-choice by both the empirical and theoretical approaches.  As such, focusing on one 
model for hypothesis testing purposes requires a more intuitive approach that considers the 
empirical and theoretical strengths, but also includes other considerations.    
 Because each model has some inherent weakness due to the problematic nature of the 
revenue data for the 1950-1975 timeframe, one additional consideration when selecting a model-
of-choice should be that the model’s inherent weakness can reasonably and convincingly be 
overcome in as parsimonious a manner as possible.  Regarding the problem data, for example, it 
is neither reasonable or realistic to assume that additional information can be obtained that would 
result in the ability to accurately identify and segregate media-only revenues for the 1950-1975.   
Of the models studied, the one which offers the best opportunity to improve on the 
integrity of the data is Model 6, which only considered revenues after 1975 (i.e., segmented 
revenues only).  The reason for this is that the major weakness of this model is that there are only 
32 observations in the sample size.  As discussed in Section B, each year of reported earnings 
subsequent to this study increases the number of valid observations, and therefore increases the 
validity of the model.  Section B also recognizes that this model is one of the strongest from a 
theoretical perspective, albeit the empirical aspect of this model is weak.  Additional 
observations should strengthen this aspect of the model, thereby making it a model that should be 
used and updated.   
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While this model does not represent a best fit estimate of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .346), it is of interest to note that 
all four models which include adjusted 1950—1975 revenues are shown to be a best fit or 
approaching an F-statistic that is consistent with a “best fit” model.  This could indicate the 
positive impact that additional observations might have on creating a “best fit” model that 
provides explanatory and predictive power.  It could also reaffirm the importance of making sure 
that revenues used are truly media-only revenues, as the model which included unsegmented 
revenues was the worst model of all in terms of achieving a best fit. 
E. Understanding the Effect of Internet Adoption 
As expected, the limited number of observations available to study the pattern of Internet 
Adoption makes it difficult to identify any trends or reach any conclusions with respect to the 
influence that Internet Adoption has on media market structure.  With only 19 observations, we 
cannot conclude that the model is a best fit (“Prob > F” = .192).  Further, none of the 
independent variables show any statistical significance as a predictor of changes in the market 
structure of the media industry (see Table 13).  Obviously this does not mean that the Internet 
specifically, or technological innovation in general, has no influence on the market structure of 
the media industry.  At best, it merely leaves as undetermined the nature of the relationship 
between Internet Adoption and media market structure.  As with the models examining the effect 
of changes in television adoption and changes in cable TV adoption, a longer timeframe with 
additional observations of Internet Adoption rates will be helpful to more accurately identify and 
define any affect that Internet Adoption has on media market structure. 
F. Hypothesis Testing 
 As concluded in Section C, Model 6, which relies on segmented revenues only, should be 
the “model of choice,” particularly when selecting a model from which to build upon and modify 
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in future studies.  As such, it is appropriate to first consider Model 6 when testing the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter Four.  However, since it is problematic to reach firm conclusions until a 
more robust model is developed, it is appropriate to also examine the other models to see if they 
provide some indication that might lead to a different conclusion.  In essence, the nature of the 
“dueling models” experienced in this study suggests that Model 6 should be used to provide an 
initial indication as to whether each hypothesis is supported or unsupported, and the other 
models should be used to indicate if and how such support may be impacted with the advent of a 
more robust model. 
 Model 6, the “model of choice,” concludes that changes in the adoption rate of television 
is not a statistically significant predictor of changes in the market structure of the media industry 
(b=-9.43, t=-.04). Accordingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that changes in the adoption 
rate of television do not result in changes in changes in the market structure of the media 
industry.   
It is important, however, to remember that this independent variable showed virtually no 
variation during the 1975—2009 timeframe covered by this model.  This is understandable since, 
by 1975, over 97% of households had a television.  Any meaningful variation in the adoption 
rate of television occurred in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  By eliminating these two decades from 
consideration, Model 6 fails to capture the true trend of the adoption pattern of television, and 
thus any meaningful changes from year-to-year during this crucial time.   As a result, the 
inability to reject H1 is as likely to be caused by the failure to capture television’s true adoption 
pattern as it is likely to be caused by the lack of a causal relationship between this independent 
variable and the dependent variable of changes in the market structure of the media industry.  
 The idea that changes in the adoption rate of television might be a statistically significant 
predictor of changes in media market structure is supported by the results of Model 2 and Model 
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5.  Model 2, which eliminates revenues from the nine conglomerates for the 1950—1975 period, 
finds changes in the adoption rate of television to be a statistically significant predictor of 
changes in the market structure of the media industry (b=-.755, t=-1.35).   
Similarly, Model 5, which considers adjusted market shares for these nine conglomerates 
that allow for year-to-year fluctuations during the 1950-1975 timeframe, also finds a statistically 
significant relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable (b=-.685, 
t=.1.35).  Given the conflicting results, and given that the model of choice indicates a statistically 
insignificant relationship, it is prudent to conclude that H1 is not supported. 
Model 6 also indicates that the adoption rate of cable television is a statistically 
significant predictor of changes in the market structure of the media industry (b=-.355, t=-1.89). 
As such, despite the limitations previously discussed with regards to this and the other models, 
H2 is supported, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that changes in the adoption rate of 
cable television do not result in changes in the market structure of the media industry. Moreover, 
the results confirm the anticipated positive direction of the relationship between two variables.  
Regarding the previously discussed limitations, it should be reiterated that this is the only model 
that finds this independent variable to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent 
variable.   
To test the final hypothesis (H3), results from Model 7 are utilized.  This hypothesis 
proposes a causal relationship between changes in the adoption rate of the Internet and changes 
in media market structure, The model indicates no statistical significance in the independent 
variable (b=-.011, t=-.11).  Moreover, neither of the control variables are found to be statistically 
significant predictors of the dependent variable, and the model itself is not a good fit estimate of 
the relationship between the independent variables (including control variables) and the 
dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .192).   
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The null hypothesis, which states that changes in the adoption rate of the Internet do not 
affect changes in the market structure of the media industry, cannot be rejected.  It is likely that 
the failure to reject the null hypothesis is due to the small sample size (N=19).  As discussed in 
Section D, the nature of the relationship between this independent variable and the dependent 
variable should be examined when more observations allow for a more statistically acceptable 
sample size.  
G. Improving the Model through Future Research Initiatives 
 At a minimum, the discussion in the previous sections in this chapter supports the idea 
that future research efforts are warranted to specifically examine the proposed model used in this 
study for possible refinement, but also to study the general question of what influences help to 
shape the market structure of the media.  Indeed, it may be determined that answering the larger, 
broader question requires a different approach which ultimately may provide new insight into 
how best to refine the model that is examined in this study.  Conversely, refining the model 
specifically proposed in this study as the preferred model may lead to improved explanatory and 
predictive power, which may ultimately help answer the more general questions regarding media 
market structure.  
 The results of this study, while inconclusive in most instances, do nothing to take away 
from the theoretical foundation for the idea of a causal relationship between technological 
innovation and media market structure.  Rather, the empirical basis of this study—reflected in 
the inability to develop an adequate sample size of relevant and consistent data—proved to be 
the most problematic aspect of developing a solid model of media market structure.  In a sense, 
the problematic nature of the data is a positive finding because there are several manageable and 
practical approaches that can be employed in future studies.  At a minimum, it is clear that over 
time, future years of media-only revenue data will provide a larger sample size of observations of 
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media market structure.  As this sample size increases, the need to include early years of 
unsegmented data is minimized, and the model will be based on data from one standard data set 
with no variations in data collection or reporting methods. 
 If future studies are to rely on new years of media-only revenue data, it will probably be 
necessary to eliminate “Changes in television adoption” as an independent variable.  Using 
media-only revenue data requires the analysis to begin with the year 1975; by this point, over 
97% of American households had television, so there is virtually no variation in this variable 
when the timeframe is 1975 and beyond.  Without any variation in this variable, it is impossible 
to identify any influence that television adoption would have on the variation of any dependent 
variable. 
 Another approach to examining this issue, and yet another opportunity for a future 
research endeavor, is to change the way in which the dependent variable is defined and 
measured.  Doing so would require finding a suitable measure of market structure that can be 
used in lieu of calculating a measurement based on market shares, as is the case with the HHI.  
The HHI has been shown to be one of the most robust and respectable measures of market 
concentration but the problem with the revenue data for the 1950-1975 timeframe makes it 
difficult to calculate HHI at enough points in time.  Accordingly, there is a compelling reason to 
consider other ways to measure market structure without relying on revenue data.   
Several studies have defined an industry’s market structure by tracking the number of 
firms within an industry (Achs & Audrestch, 1987; Mazzucato, 2000).  While there are some 
weaknesses with this approach, it nonetheless eliminates the problems experienced in this study 
by having to rely on different data sources that use different methods for calculating and 
reporting revenue figures for companies with media operations.  With this approach, the entire 
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1950-2009 timeframe could be studied in a way that relies on using only one approach for 
operationalizing media market structure as the dependent variable. 
 Both of these two approaches are designed to improve the reliability of the model—
through additional observations of the variables by adding subsequent years of observations—
and the validity of the model by incorporating variables that are more accurately and fully 
measuring the desired variable (in this case, market structure).  Adding additional observations 
also increases the degrees of freedom in the model, allowing for additional variables to be 
included and considered.  For example, future studies should examine the interaction between 
variables, in particular the interaction between each of the independent variables and the control 
variable of regulatory environment. 
 It is interesting that none of the models indicated a statistically significant relationship 
between the regulatory environment and the dependent variable.  This seems counter-intuitive 
and contrary to previous work cited in Chapters Two and Five regarding the effect of regulation 
on economic conditions in general and market structures in particular.  This may be due to the 
fact that, indeed, regulation does not have a meaningful and predictable effect on media market 
structure.  However, the failure to find significant results may simply indicate the need to find a 
better way to operationalize the concept of regulation into an appropriate and measureable 
variable.  Future studies should also consider this opportunity, and explore other ways of 
defining regulation in order to measure its effect on the media industry, specifically as it relates 
to market structure.   
Doing so may create new challenges, including the ability to quantifiably measure a 
causal relationship between these variables.  Several scholars have, indeed, reported on the effect 
of a specific regulation on the media industry, such as the effect of the Newspaper Preservation 
Act of 1970 (Martin, 2008). Others have examined how a particular regulation (e.g., The 
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Financial Interest and Syndication Rules) has specifically impacted media ownership (Einstein, 
2004).  While such studies may rely on some type of quantitative analysis, generally the 
quantitative aspect of the analysis has been used to define the variables independently of each 
other, and not to define or measure a relationship between the variables.  These studies show the 
difficulty in developing a model that effectively quantifies a causal relationship between the 
particular regulation and media market structure.  It may be necessary to assess the impact of 
regulation on media market structure in a more qualitative or contextual manner; future research 
efforts should explore this to properly incorporate the effect of regulation on the market structure 
of the media. 
H. Additional Research Initiatives  
 This study—and the proposed future research opportunities identified in Section G—have 
focused on examining the market structure of the media industry as a dependent variable in order 
to better understand those forces which shape media market structure.  When considering 
innovation as a potential influencer of the market structure of the media industry, this study has 
focused specifically on radical innovations.  As discussed in Chapter Three, incremental 
innovations may have a distinct and possibly different relationship with respect to media market 
structure.  Future research efforts should examine this relationship as well.   
The question of what effects may result from a concentrated or competitive media 
industry are equally compelling.  Indeed, one of the reasons many media critics are so concerned 
with media market structure is because of the impact that the media industry has on the free 
exchange of a diversity of ideas, perspectives, and opinions (Baker, 2007; Nichols & 
McChesney, 2009).   
Numerous studies have attempted to identify the impact that a concentrated media market 
has on the diversity of content produced and distributed by the media industry (Chambers, 2001; 
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Drushel, 1998).  Results of such studied are varied, reflecting the varied approaches to defining 
the problem, as well as indicating an inconclusive nature with respect to resolving the problem.  
Such studies will likely continue to be undertaken, but with likely differing results.  Future 
studies examining the effect of media market structure on content diversity would likely be best 
served by attempting to understand under what conditions a concentrated industry leads to 
increased content diversity, and under what conditions a concentrated industry leads to decreased 
content diversity. 
 Another possible effect of the market structure of the media industry may be in shaping 
the public’s trust of the media.  Does a concentrated (or competitive) media industry ultimately 
result in the public’s increased trust or distrust?  Such a research question would likely require 
examining the possibility of intermediate variables.  For example, it may be that media market 
structure influences media content diversity (as discussed above, possibly under certain 
conditions), which includes news content, which in turn affects the public’s trust of the media.   
 It is also possible that media market structure influences the public’s perception of the 
media, which in turn helps shape the public’s level of trust in the media, regardless of any 
change in content diversity.  Such questions are natural extensions of this study, particularly once 
a reliable and valid measurement of media market structure is identified. Moreover, if any 
relationship exists between media market structure and the public’s trust in the media, it could 
(and should) have implications when considering future media policy initiatives, particularly as it 
relates to media ownership issues. 
There is some preliminary data showing a strong correlation between a competitive (i.e., 
deconcentrated) media market structure and the public’s trust in the media.  Since 1997, Gallup 
Polling has conducted frequent surveys designed to measure the public’s trust of the media 
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(Morales, 2012).10  Results of those indicating a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust are 
negatively correlated with the level of ownership concentration in the media, as measured by 
HHI.  Table 14 shows the correlation, and Figure 7 illustrates this relationship over the 13-year 
period.  To be sure, thirteen observations or measurements of the public’s trust in the media is 
too small of a sample size to reach any conclusions.  Further, it is clear that a strong correlation 
does not in itself support the idea that there is a causal relationship.  Nevertheless, such a  strong 
correlation warrants—at a minimum—a closer look at this relationship in order to further 
understand if and how the market structure of the  media industry does in fact have an influence 
on the level of trust that citizens place in the media. 





HHI 1.0000 -0.748* 
Media Trust -0.748* 1.0000 
*Correlation is significant at the p<.001 level (two-tailed) 
 
  
                                                          
10 Specifically, the organization has asked the following question: “In general, how much trust and confidence do 
you have in the mass media – such as newspapers, TV, and radio – when it comes to reporting the news full, 






Figure 7. Media Concentration and Media Trust, 1997—2009.  (Illustration of the 
relationship between media concentration—as measured by HHI, and the public’s 












 This study has examined the media industry in order to identify and measure how 
technological innovations affect the industry’s market structure.  Building upon previous studies 
of individual segments within the media industry, this study has approached the research 
question in a new way by considering the media industry as a whole.  This approach recognizes 
the changing nature of the media industry due to convergence of multiple media platforms and 
the related horizontal and vertical integration that continues to occur within the industry.  Any 
new approach to examining a research question generally requires new ways of defining and 
operationalizing variables, and new models to incorporate these variables.  In examining the 
relationship between technological innovation and the market structure of the media industry as a 
whole, this study proposes an initial model that can be further refined.  This model considers 
specific technological innovations that have impacted the media industry over the last 60 years, 
while also considering other exogenous variables such as government regulation and economic 
conditions as other influences of media market structure. 
 Results from this study are inconclusive in terms of explaining how technological 
innovation influences the market structure of the media industry.  At a minimum, the study does 
not contradict the idea that technological innovation influences the market structure of the media 
industry.  Indeed, both TV adoption and Cable TV adoption, as measured by changes in their 
respective adoption rates, were found to be statistically significant predictors of media market 
structure in at least one variation of the proposed model.  Rather, the inconclusive findings point 
to the need to find a way to capture more observations of the variables.   
 Indeed, the multiple models considered in Chapter Six, and the ultimate strength of this 
model will come from not just from understanding how technological innovation influences the 
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market structure of the media industry, but also how such innovation interacts with other 
variables in achieving this influence.  Having a more complete understanding of how and why 
the market structure of the media industry changes can certainly provide a foundation for 
government’s efforts to develop sound media policy, or for businesses looking to make strategic 
decisions within the competitive landscape of the media industry.  Until then, agencies and 
businesses face the risk of making strategic decisions that may be well-intentioned, but 
ultimately prove to be problematic and counterproductive.  The media industry is full of such 
decisions:  In 2001 AOL and Time Warner decided that a merger-of-equals was sound business 
policy, only to decide eight years later that the merger had failed, and announced the two 
operations would split back into two separate companies (Musgrove & Ahrens, 2009).  Similarly, 
the FCC ultimately concluded that its Financial Interest and Syndication Rules were ineffective 
in ensuring competition among producers of media content (Einstein, 2004).   
In a sense, the tentative findings resulting from this study could be viewed as consistent 
with the work of previous scholars who have concluded that innovation’s effect on market 
structures, while present and significant, is best understood in contextual terms, allowing for the 
unique characteristics of each innovation, each industry, and each situation.  As stated early in 
this dissertation, Mansfield acknowledged that an industry could become more concentrated after 
the introduction of new technology, but that such an effect would “depend on the nature and 
sources of the new technology” (p. 209, 1983).  In addition, the words of Scherer presented 
earlier are also appropriate.  In discussing the debate over Schumpeterian theory, Scherer’s 
observation could be extended to the general debate over innovation and market structure when 
he noted, “the links between market structure, innovation, and economic welfare are extremely 
complex” (p. 1421, 1992).  This complexity, however, should not be seen as an excuse to dismiss 
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or ignore these links, but rather, as an inspiration and motivation to continue to study and better 
understand them.  
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Companies Included in Study 
Year Reported: 2009 
1. A.H. BELO 
2. ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS 
CO 
3. ANSWERS CORP 
4. AOL  
5. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP 
6. BELO 
7. CABLEVISION 
8. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC 
9. CBS 
10. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
11. CINEMARK HOLDINGS INC 
12. CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP 
13. CLEAR CHANNEL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
14. CLEARWIRE CORP 
15. COGENT COMMUNICATIONS GRP 
16. COMCAST 
17. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
18. CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS 
19. CUMULUS MEDIA INC 
20. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
21. DIRECT TV 
22. DISCOVERY COMM 
23. DISH NETWORK CORPORATION 
24. DISNEY 
25. DREAMWORKS SKG 
26. EARTHLINK INC 
27. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
28. ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
29. ENTRAVISION 
30. FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
31. GANNETT 
32. GATEHOUSE MEDIA INC 
33. GENERAL ELECTRIC 
34. GOOGLE 
35. GRAY TELEVISION 
36. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
37. INTERNET AMERICA INC 
38. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
39. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
40. LAMAR ADVERTISING 
41. LEE ENTERPRISES 
42. LIBERTY  
43. LIN TV CORP 
44. LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP 
45. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP 
46. MARTHA STEWART LIVING 
OMNIMEDIA 
47. MCCLATCHY 
48. MCGRAW HILL 
49. MEDIA GENERAL 
50. MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
51. MEREDITH CORP 
52. MICROSOFT 
53. MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC 
54. NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC 
55. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
56. NEWSCORP 
57. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP 
58. NTN BUZZTIME INC 
59. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC 
60. PEARSON PLC  -ADR 
61. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
62. RADIO ONE 
63. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC 
64. RHI ENTERTAINMENT INC 
65. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS  -CL A 
66. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
67. SALON MEDIA GROUP INC 
68. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
69. SCRIPPS 
70. SCRIPPS NETWORK INTERACTIVE 
71. SEVEN ARTS PICTURES PLC 




76. SUREWEST COMMUNICATIONS 
77. THESTREET.COM 
78. THOMSON-REUTERS CORP 
79. TIME WARNER CABLE 
80. TIME WARNER 
81. TIVO 




86. WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP 
Year Reported: 2009 (cont’d.) 
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87. WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE 
CO 
88. WASHINGTON POST 
89. WEBMD HEALTH CORP 
90. WESTWOOD ONE 
91. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 





Year Reported: 2005 
1. A.H. BELO 
2. ACME COMMUNICATIONS 
3. ADELPHIA 
4. ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS SYS GP 
5. ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS CO 
6. ALLIANCE ATLANTIS COMM -CL B 
7. AMERICAN MEDIA OPERATIONS 
8. ANSWERS CORP 
9. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP 
10. BELO 
11. CABLEVISION 
12. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC 
13. CBS 
14. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
15. CINEMARK HOLDINGS INC 
16. CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP 
17. CKRUSH INC 
18. CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 
19. CLEARWIRE CORP 
20. CNET NETWORKS INC 
21. COGENT COMMUNICATIONS GRP 
22. COMCAST 
23. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
24. COX COMMUNICATIONS   
25. COX RADIO INC  -CL A 
26. CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS 
27. CT COMMUNICATIONS INC 
28. CUMULUS MEDIA INC 
29. D & E COMMUNICATIONS INC 
30. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
31. DIRECT TV 
32. DISCOVERY COMM 
33. DISNEY 
34. DOW JONES 
35. DREAMWORKS SKG 
36. DSL.NET INC 
37. EARTHLINK INC 
38. ECHOSTAR 
39. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
40. ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
41. ENTRAVISION 
42. EQUITY MEDIA HOLDINGS CORP 
43. FAMILY ROOM ENTMT CORP 
44. FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
45. FUSION TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
46. GANNETT 
47. GATEHOUSE MEDIA INC 
48. GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC 
49. GENERAL ELECTRIC 
50. GOOGLE 
51. GRANITE BROADCASTING 
52. GRAY TELEVISION 
53. HEARST-ARGYLE 
54. HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
55. HOLLINGER 
56. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
57. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
58. IBROADBAND INC 
59. INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS CO 
60. INTERNET AMERICA INC 
61. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
62. JOURNAL REGISTER CO 
63. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
64. KNIGHT RIDDER 
65. LAMAR ADVERTISING 
66. LEE ENTERPRISES 
67. LIBERTY  
68. LIN TV CORP 
69. LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP 
70. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP 
71. MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMD 
72. MCCLATCHY 
73. MCGRAW HILL 
74. MEDIA GENERAL 
75. MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
76. MEDIANEWS GROUP INC 
77. MEREDITH CORP 
78. METRO INTL SA  -CL B 
79. MICROSOFT 
80. MONARCH SERVICES INC 
81. MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC 
82. NAPSTER INC 
83. NASPERS LTD  -ADR 
84. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
85. NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC 
86. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
87. NEWSCORP 
88. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP 
89. NTN BUZZTIME INC 
90. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC 
91. PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS 




Year Reported: 2005 (cont’d.) 
93. PEARSON PLC  -ADR 
94. PIXAR 
95. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
96. PROTOSOURCE CORP 
97. RADIO ONE 
98. READERS DIGEST 
99. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC 
100. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR 
101. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS  -CL A 
102. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
103. SALON MEDIA GROUP INC 
104. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
105. SCRIPPS 




110. SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC 
111. SUREWEST COMMUNICATIONS 
112. THESTREET.COM 
113. THOMSON CORP 
114. TIME WARNER 
115. TIVO 
116. TRIBUNE CO 
117. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA   -ADR 




122. WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP 
123. WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE CO 
124. WASHINGTON POST 
125. WEBMD HEALTH CORP 
126. WESTWOOD ONE 
127. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 
128. WORLD WRESTLING ENTMT INC 
129. XANADOO CO 
130. XM SATELLITE 
131. YAHOO 




Year Reported: 2000 
 
1. ACKERLEY GROUP INC 
2. ACME COMMUNICATIONS 
3. ADELPHIA 
4. ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS SYS 
GP 
5. ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS 
CO 
6. ALLIANCE ATLANTIS COMM -CL B 
7. AMERICA ONLINE 
8. AMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA INC 
9. AMERICAN RADIO SYS CORP-CL A 
10. ARAHOVA COMMUNICATIONSC-1 
11. ASCENT ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 
12. ASK JEEVES INC 
13. AT&T 
14. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP 
15. BELO 
16. BENEDEK COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
17. BERTLESMANN 
18. BIG CITY RADIO INC  -CL A 
19. BRILL MEDIA CO LLC 
20. CABLEVISION 
21. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC 
22. CHANCELLOR BROADCSTNG  -CL 
A 
23. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
24. CHRIS CRAFT 
25. CINCINNATI BELL INC 
26. CINEMARK USA INC 
27. CINEMASTAR LUXURY THEATERS 
28. CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP 
29. CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC 
30. CLASSIC COMMUNICATIONS INC 
31. CLEAR CHANNEL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
32. CNET NETWORKS INC 
33. COMCAST 
34. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
35. COX COMMUNICATIONS   
36. COX RADIO INC  -CL A 
37. CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS 
38. CT COMMUNICATIONS INC 
39. CTN MEDIA GROUP INC 
40. CUMULUS MEDIA INC 
41. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
42. DISCOVERY COMM 
43. DISNEY 
44. DOW JONES 
45. DSL.NET INC 
46. EARTHLINK INC 
47. EASYRIDERS INC 
48. ECHOSTAR 
49. ELEPHANT TALK COMM INC 
50. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
51. ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
52. ENTRAVISION 
53. EZ COMMUNICATIONS INC  -CL A 
54. FAMILY ROOM ENTMT CORP 
55. FASTNET CORP 
56. FILM ROMAN INC 
57. FIRST LOOK MEDIA INC 
58. FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
59. GANNETT 
60. GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC 
61. GENERAL ELECTRIC 
62. GENERAL MEDIA INC 
63. GENERAL MOTORS 
64. GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT 
65. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
66. GOOGLE 
67. GRANITE BROADCASTING 
68. GRAY TELEVISION 
69. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
70. HEARST CORPORATION 
71. HEARST-ARGYLE 
72. HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
73. HIGH SPEED ACCESS CORP 
74. HISPANIC BROADCASTING  -CL A 
75. HISPANIC TV NETWORK INC 
76. HOLLINGER 
77. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
78. HUNGRY MINDS INC 
79. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
80. INFINITY BROADCASTING  -CL A 
81. INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS CO 
82. INTEGRITY MEDIA INC 
83. INTERMEDIA MKTG SOLUTNS INC 
84. INTERNET AMERICA INC 
85. INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC  -CL A 
86. ITC DELTACOM INC 
87. JAMES CABLE PARTNERS LP 
88. JONES MEDIA NETWORKS LTD 
89. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
90. JOURNAL REGISTER CO 
91. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
92. KNIGHT RIDDER 
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Year Reported: 2000 (cont’d.) 
 
93. KUSHNER LOCKE CO 
94. LAMAR ADVERTISING 
95. LAS AMERICAS BROADBAND INC 
96. LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP 
97. LEE ENTERPRISES 
98. LIBERTY  
99. LIN TV CORP 
100. LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP 
101. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP 
102. MARKETWATCH INC 
103. MARTHA STEWART LIVING 
OMNIMD 
104. MCCLATCHY 
105. MCGRAW HILL 
106. MEDIA GENERAL 
107. MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
108. MEDIANEWS GROUP INC 
109. MEREDITH CORP 
110. METRO GLOBAL MEDIA INC 
111. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC 
112. METRO INTL SA  -CL B 
113. MILLBROOK PRESS INC 
114. MONARCH SERVICES INC 
115. MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC 
116. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
117. NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC 
118. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
119. NEWS COMMUNICATIONS 
120. NEWSCORP 
121. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP 
122. NEXTMEDIA OPERATING INC 
123. NORTHLAND CABLE TELEVISION 
124. NTN BUZZTIME INC 
125. NUCENTRIX BROADBAND 
NETWORKS 
126. ON COMMAND CORP 
127. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC 
128. PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS 
129. PEARSON PLC  -ADR 
130. PEGASUS 
131. PIXAR 
132. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
133. PROTOSOURCE CORP 
134. PULITZER 
135. RADIO ONE 
136. RAINBOW MEDIA GROUP 
137. RAYCOM MEDIA 
138. READERS DIGEST 
139. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC 
140. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR 
141. RNETHEALTH INC 
142. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS  -CL A 
143. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
144. SALON MEDIA GROUP INC 
145. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
146. SCRIPPS 
147. SEAGRAM'S 
148. SFX BROADCASTING INC  -CL A 
149. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO 
150. SINCLAIR 
151. SONY 
152. SPECTRASITE INC 
153. SPORTSLINE.COM INC 
154. STC BROADCASTING INC 
155. SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC 
156. SUSQUEHANNA MEDIA CO 
157. TEAM COMMUNICATIONS GROUP 
158. TERRA NETWORKS SA  -ADR 
159. THESTREET.COM 
160. THOMSON CORP 
161. TIME WARNER 
162. TIMES MIRROR 
163. TIVO 
164. TM CENTURY INC 
165. TRIATHLON BROADCST CO  -CL A 
166. TRIBUNE CO 
167. TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC 
168. TV GUIDE INC 
169. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA   -ADR 
170. UNITED ONLINE INC 




175. WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE 
CO 
176. WASHINGTON POST 
177. WEBMD HEALTH CORP 
178. WESTWOOD ONE 
179. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 
180. WORLD WRESTLING ENTMT INC 
181. WRC MEDIA INC 
182. XANADOO CO 
183. YAHOO 
184. YOUNG BROADCASTING 






1. ACKERLEY GROUP INC 
2. ADELPHIA 
3. ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS 
4. ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS CO 
5. AMERICA ONLINE 
6. AMERICAN MEDIA INC  -CL A 
7. AMERICAN TELECASTING INC 
8. AMFM INC 
9. ARGYLE 
10. ASCENT ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 
11. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP 
12. BELO 
13. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 
14. BERTLESMANN 
15. BET HOLDINGS INC  -CL A 
16. BIG CITY RADIO INC  -CL A 
17. BOX WORLDWIDE INC 
18. BRILL MEDIA CO LLC 
19. CABLE MICHIGAN INC 
20. CABLEMAXX HOLDINGS INC 
21. CABLEVISION 
22. CABLEVISION INDUSTRIES CORP 
23. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC 
24. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC 
25. CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS  -CL A 
26. CENTURY COMMUN  -CL A 
27. CHRIS CRAFT 
28. CINEMARK USA INC 
29. CINEMASTAR LUXURY THEATERS 
30. CINERGI PICTURES ENTMT INC 
31. CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC 
32. CLASSIC COMMUNICATIONS INC 
33. CLEAR CHANNEL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
34. CNET NETWORKS INC 
35. COMCAST 
36. COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER 
37. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
38. CONTINENTAL CBLVISION  -CL A 
39. COWLES MEDIA CO  -COM 
40. COX COMMUNICATIONS   
41. COX RADIO INC  -CL A 
42. CTN MEDIA GROUP INC 
43. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
44. DISCOVERY COMM 
45. DISNEY 
46. DOW JONES 
47. EARTHLINK INC 
48. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
49. ENTRAVISION 
50. FILM ROMAN INC 
51. FIRST NATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT 
52. FOUR MEDIA CO 
53. GANNETT 
54. GARDEN STATE NEWSPAPERS 
55. GENERAL ELECTRIC 
56. GENERAL MEDIA INC 
57. GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT 
58. GOLDWYN (SAMUEL) CO 
59. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
60. GRANITE BROADCASTING 
61. GRAY TELEVISION 
62. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
63. HEARST CORPORATION 
64. HEARST-ARGYLE 
65. HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
66. HISPANIC BROADCASTING  -CL A 
67. HOLLINGER 
68. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
69. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
70. INFINITY BROADCASTING  -CL A 
71. INFINITY MEDIA 
72. INTEGRITY MEDIA INC 
73. INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC  -CL A 
74. INTL FAMILY ENTERTAIN  -CL B 
75. JACOR COMMUNICATIONS 
76. JONES INTERCABLE  -LP-CL A 
77. JONES MEDIA NETWORKS LTD 
78. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
79. KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC 
80. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
81. KNIGHT RIDDER 
82. KUSHNER LOCKE CO 
83. LAMAR ADVERTISING 
84. LANCIT MEDIA ENTMT LTD 
85. LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP 
86. LEE ENTERPRISES 
87. LIBERTY  
88. LIN TV CORP 
89. LIVE ENTERTAINMENT 
90. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP 
91. MCCLATCHY 




Year Reported: 1995 (cont’d.) 
 
93. MEDIA GENERAL 
94. MEDIAONE GROUP INC 
95. MERCOM INC 
96. MEREDITH CORP 
97. METRO GLOBAL MEDIA INC 
98. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC 
99. MONARCH SERVICES INC 
100. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
101. NEW WORLD TELEVISION INC 
102. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
103. NEWS COMMUNICATIONS 
104. NEWSCORP 
105. NORTHLAND CABLE TELEVISION 
106. NOSTALGIA NETWORK INC 
107. NTN BUZZTIME INC 
108. NUCENTRIX BROADBAND 
NETWORKS 
109. NYNEX CABLECOMM GP PLC  -
ADR 
110. ON COMMAND CORP 
111. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC 
112. OUTLET COMMUNICATION  -CL A 
113. PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS 
114. PEGASUS 
115. PEOPLES CHOICE TV CORP 
116. PIXAR 
117. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
118. POLYGRAM NV  -ADR 
119. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL CO  -CL A 
120. PULITZER 
121. RADIO ONE 
122. RAYCOM MEDIA 
123. READERS DIGEST 
124. REGAL CINEMAS INC 
125. RENAISSANCE COMMUNICATNS 
CP 
126. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR 
127. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
128. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS  -CL A 
129. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
130. SAVOY PICTURES ENTMT INC 
131. SBC TECHNOLOGIES INC/DEL 
132. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
133. SCRIPPS 
134. SEAGRAM'S 
135. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO 
136. SINCLAIR 
137. SONY 
138. SOUTHERN STARR BROADCASTG 
GP 
139. SPECTRAVISION INC 
140. SPELLING ENTMT INC  -CL A 
141. SPICE ENTERTAINMENT COS INC 
142. SPORTS MEDIA INC 
143. SPORTSLINE.COM INC 
144. STECK-VAUGHN PUBLISHING CP 
145. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
146. SUNGROUP INC 
147. SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC 
148. SUSQUEHANNA MEDIA CO 
149. TCA CABLE TV INC 
150. TCI 
151. TELEMUNDO GROUP INC  -CL A 
152. TESCORP INC 
153. THOMSON CORP 
154. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT 
155. TIME WARNER 
156. TIMES MIRROR 
157. TM CENTURY INC 
158. TRIBUNE CO 
159. TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC 
160. TURNER BROADCASTING  -CL B 
161. TV FILME INC 
162. TV GUIDE INC 
163. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA   -ADR 
164. UNITED TELEVISION INC 
165. UNIVISION 
166. US SATELLITE BROADCST  -CL A 
167. VIACOM 
168. WASHINGTON POST 
169. WAVERLY INC 
170. WESTINGHOUSE 
171. WESTWOOD ONE 
172. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 
173. WIRELESS CABLE ATLANTA INC 
174. WIRELESS ONE INC 
175. XANADOO CO 
176. YAHOO 









Year Reported: 1990 
 
1. 21ST CENTURY FILM CORP 
2. ACKERLEY GROUP INC 
3. ADELPHIA 
4. AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS 
5. ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS 
6. AMERICAN CITY BUS JOURNALS 
7. AMERICAN COMMUN & TV 
8. AMERICAN MEDIA INC  -CL A 
9. AMERICAN SCREEN CO 
10. AMERICAN TV & COMMUN  -CL A 
11. BAKER COMMUNICAITONS 
12. BELO 
13. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 
14. BOX WORLDWIDE INC 
15. BURNHAM BROADCASTING CO  -LP 
16. CABLEVISION 
17. CABLEVISION INDUSTRIES CORP 
18. CANNON PICTURES INC 
19. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC 
20. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC 
21. CAROLCO PICTURES INC 
22. CBS 
23. CC MEDIA HOLDINGS (CLR CHNL) 
24. CCH INC  -CL A 
25. CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS  -CL A 
26. CENTURY COMMUN  -CL A 
27. CHRIS CRAFT 
28. CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC 
29. COMCAST 
30. COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER 
31. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
32. CONTINENTAL CBLVISION  -CL A 
33. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
34. DANIELS & ASSOCIATES INC 
35. DISNEY 
36. DOW JONES 
37. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
38. FILMSTAR INC 
39. FRIES ENTERTAINMENT INC 
40. GALAXY CABLEVISION  -LP 
41. GANNETT 
42. GENERAL ELECTRIC 
43. GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT 
44. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
45. GRANITE BROADCASTING 
46. GRAY TELEVISION 
47. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
48. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
49. HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
50. HOLDEN-DAY INC 
51. HOLLINGER 
52. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
53. IMAGINE FILMS ENMT INC 
54. INFINITY BROADCASTING  -CL A 
55. INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC  -CL A 
56. INTL BROADCAST SYSTEMS -CL A 
57. JACOR COMMUNICATIONS 
58. JONES INTERCABLE  -LP-CL A 
59. JONES SPACELINK LTD  -CL A 
60. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
61. KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC 
62. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
63. KNIGHT RIDDER 
64. KUSHNER LOCKE CO 
65. LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP 
66. LEE ENTERPRISES 
67. MCCLATCHY 
68. MCGRAW HILL 
69. MEDIA GENERAL 
70. MERCOM INC 
71. MERCURY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 
72. MEREDITH CORP 
73. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC 
74. MILLICOM INC 
75. MULTIMEDIA 
76. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
77. NEW CENTURY COMMUNCTN  -CL A 
78. NEW LINE CINEMA CORP 
79. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
80. NEWS COMMUNICATIONS 
81. NEWSCORP 
82. NOSTALGIA NETWORK INC 
83. NTN BUZZTIME INC 
84. ORION PICTURES CORP 
85. OSBORN COMMUNICATIONS 
86. OUTLET COMMUNICATION  -CL A 
87. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
88. PARK COMMUNICATIONS INC 
89. PAUL ENTERTAINMENT INC 
90. PINELANDS INC 
91. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 




Year Reported:  1990 (cont’d.) 
 
93. POLYGRAM NV  -ADR 
94. POLYMUSE INC 
95. PRICE/STERN/SLOAN INC 
96. PULITZER 
97. QUEEN CITY BROADCASTING INC 
98. READERS DIGEST 
99. REPUBLIC PICTURES 
100. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR 
101. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
102. SBC TECHNOLOGIES INC/DEL 
103. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
104. SCI TELEVISION INC  -CL B 
105. SCRIPPS 
106. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO 
107. SHOP TELEVISION NETWORK INC 
108. SOUTHERN STARR BROADCASTG 
GP 
109. SPECTRAVISION INC 
110. SPELLING ENTMT INC  -CL A 
111. SPORTS MEDIA INC 
112. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
113. SUNGROUP INC 
114. TCA CABLE TV INC 
115. TCI 
116. TELEMUNDO GROUP INC  -CL A 
117. THOMSON CORP 
118. TIME WARNER 
119. TIMES MIRROR 
120. TM CENTURY INC 
121. TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC 
122. TRIBUNE CO 
123. TRIBUNE/SWAB-FOX COS  -CL A 
124. TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC 
125. TURNER BROADCASTING  -CL B 
126. TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM 
127. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
128. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA   -ADR 
129. UNITED TELEVISION INC 
130. VIACOM 
131. VIDCOM POST INC 
132. VISTA ORGANIZATION LTD 
133. WASHINGTON POST 
134. WAVERLY INC 
135. WESTWOOD ONE 






Year Reported: 1985 
 
1. ACKERLEY GROUP INC 
2. ADDISON-WESLEY PUB  -CL B 
3. AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS 
4. ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS 
5. AMERICAN CABLESYSTEMS  -CL A 
6. AMERICAN CITY BUS JOURNALS 
7. AMERICAN COMMUN & TV 
8. AMERICAN NATL ENTERPRISES 
9. AMERICAN TV & COMMUN  -CL A 
10. ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC 
11. BAKER COMMUNICAITONS 
12. BELO 
13. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 
14. CABLEVISION 
15. CAPITAL CITIES 
16. CARDIFF COMMUNICATIONS-OLD 
17. CAROLCO PICTURES INC 
18. CBS 
19. CC MEDIA HOLDINGS (CLR CHNL) 
20. CCH INC  -CL A 
21. CHRIS CRAFT 
22. CITIZENS CABLE COMM INC 
23. COMCAST 
24. COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER 
25. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC 
26. CONTINENTAL CBLVISION  -CL A 
27. DAILY JOURNAL CORP 
28. DE LAURENTIIS FILM PTRS  -LP 
29. DISNEY 
30. DOW JONES 
31. EMMIS BROADCASTING 
32. ESSEX COMMUNICATIONS  -CL A 
33. FIRST AMERI-CABLE CORP 
34. FIRST CAROLINA COMMUNICATNS 
35. FOUR STAR INTERNATIONAL INC 
36. FRIES ENTERTAINMENT INC 
37. G. G. COMMUNICATIONS INC 
38. GANNETT 
39. GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT 
40. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
41. GRAY TELEVISION 
42. GROLIER INC 
43. GUBER-PETERS ENTMT 
44. HALMI (ROBERT) INC 
45. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
46. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
47. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INCF-26 
48. HOLDEN-DAY INC 
49. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
50. INFINITY BROADCASTING  -CL A 
51. INFLIGHT SERVICES INC 
52. JACOR COMMUNICATIONS 
53. JONES SPACELINK LTD  -CL A 
54. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
55. KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC 
56. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT 
57. KNIGHT RIDDER 
58. LAUREL ENTERTAINMENT INC 
59. LEE ENTERPRISES 
60. LORIMAR 
61. MACMILLAN INC 
62. MALRITE COMMUNICATNS 
63. MCA INC 
64. MCGRAW HILL 
65. MCI INC 
66. MCS TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 
67. MEDIA GENERAL 
68. MEDIA HORIZIONS  -CL A 
69. MERCURY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 
70. MEREDITH CORP 
71. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC 
72. MGM UA ENTERTAINMENT CO 
73. MIZLOU COMMUNICATIONS 
74. MULTIMEDIA 
75. NATIONAL LAMPOON INC  -OLD 
76. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
77. NEW LINE CINEMA CORP 
78. NEW STAR ENTERTAINMENT INC 
79. NEW VISIONS ENMNT CORP 
80. NEW WORLD ENTERTNMNT 
81. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
82. NORTH AMER COMM CORP-NEW 
83. ORION PICTURES CORP 
84. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
85. PARK COMMUNICATIONS INC 
86. PEREGRINE ENTERTAINMENT LTD 
87. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
88. PLAZA COMMUNICATIONS INC 
89. POLYMUSE INC 






Year Reported: 1985 (cont’d.) 
 
93. REPUBLIC PICTURES 
94. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR 
95. ROLLINS COMMUNICATIONS INC 
96. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
97. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
98. SCOTT CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
99. SCRIPPS 
100. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO 
101. SPECTRAVISION INC 
102. SPELLING ENTMT INC  -CL A 
103. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
104. SUNGROUP INC 
105. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
106. TCA CABLE TV INC 
107. TCI 
108. TELECAST INC 
109. TELEPICTURES CORP 
110. TELSTAR CORP 
111. TIME WARNER 
112. TIMES MIRROR 
113. TM CENTURY INC 
114. TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC 
115. TRI STAR PICTURES INC 
116. TRIBUNE CO 
117. TRIBUNE/SWAB-FOX COS  -CL A 
118. TURNER BROADCASTING  -CL B 
119. TVX BROADCAST GROUP 
120. TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM 
121. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
122. UNITED CABLE TELEVISION 
123. UNITED TELEVISION INC 
124. VESTRON INC 
125. VISTA ORGANIZATION LTD 
126. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
127. WASHINGTON POST 
128. WAVERLY INC 
129. WESTWOOD ONE 
130. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 




Year Reported: 1980 
 
1. ABKCO INDUSTRIES INC 
2. ACKERLEY GROUP INC 
3. ADDISON-WESLEY PUB  -CL B 
4. AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS 
5. ALLYN & BACON INC 
6. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
7. AMERICAN NATL ENTERPRISES 
8. ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC 
9. ATHENA COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
10. ATLANTIC TELECASTING CORP 
11. BELO 
12. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 
13. CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP 
14. CAPITAL CITIES 
15. CARDIFF COMMUNICATIONS-OLD 
16. CBS 
17. CCH INC  -CL A 
18. CHRIS CRAFT 
19. COMCAST 
20. COMMONWEALTH THEATRES 
21. COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD 
22. DISNEY 
23. DIVERSIFIED MEDIA INC 
24. DOW JONES 
25. FOUR STAR INTERNATIONAL INC 
26. G. G. COMMUNICATIONS INC 
27. GANNETT 
28. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
29. GRAY TELEVISION 
30. GROLIER INC 
31. GROVE PRESS INC 
32. GUBER-PETERS ENTMT 
33. HALMI (ROBERT) INC 
34. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
35. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
36. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INCF-26 
37. HARTE-HANKS CABLE INC 
38. HOLDEN-DAY INC 
39. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
40. INFLIGHT SERVICES INC 
41. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
42. KNIGHT RIDDER 
43. LEE ENTERPRISES 
44. MACMILLAN INC 
45. MAPLE PRESS CO 
46. MCA INC 
47. MCGRAW HILL 
48. MCI INC 
49. MEDIA GENERAL 
50. MEREDITH CORP 
51. METROMEDIA INC 
52. MGM UA ENTERTAINMENT CO 
53. MID-AMERICA PUBLISHING CORP 
54. MULTIMEDIA 
55. NATIONAL LAMPOON INC  -OLD 
56. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
57. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
58. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE INC 
59. NORTH AMERICAN PUBLISHING CO 
60. ORION PICTURES CORP 
61. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
62. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES 
63. POST CORP 
64. RCA 
65. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
66. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
67. SCRIPPS 
68. SPECTRAVISION INC 
69. SPELLING ENTERTNMT GRP INC 
70. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
71. SUNGROUP INC 
72. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
73. TCI 
74. TELEPICTURES CORP 
75. TIME WARNER 
76. TIMES MIRROR 
77. TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC 
78. TURNER BROADCASTING  -CL B 
79. TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM 
80. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
81. UNITED CABLE TELEVISION 
82. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
83. WASHINGTON POST 
84. WAVERLY INC 
85. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 




Year Reported: 1975 
 
1. ABC INDS INC 
2. ABKCO INDUSTRIES INC 
3. ACTON CORP  -OLD 
4. ADAMS RUSSELL 
5. ADDISON-WESLEY PUB  -CL B 
6. AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS 
7. ALLYN & BACON INC 
8. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
9. AMERICAN TV & COMMUN  -CL A 
10. ARCHIE ENTERPRISES INC 
11. ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC 
12. ATHENA COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
13. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
14. BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC 
15. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
16. C V INTERNATIONAL CORP 
17. CABLECOM GENERAL INC 
18. CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP 
19. CAPITAL CITIES 
20. CBS 
21. CCH INC  -CL A 
22. CHILTON CO 
23. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
24. CINEMA 5 LTD 
25. CINERAMA INC 
26. COMCAST 
27. COMMONWEALTH THEATRES 
28. COMMUNICATIONS PROPERTIES 
29. CONESTOGA ENTERPRISES 
30. CORDURA CORP 
31. COWLES COMMUNICATIONS 
32. COX CABLE COMMUNICATIONS INC 
33. COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD 
34. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
35. DIVERSIFIED MEDIA INC 
36. DOW JONES 
37. FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS 
38. GANNETT 
39. GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC 
40. GRAY TELEVISION 
41. GROLIER INC 
42. GROSS TELECASTING 
43. GROVE PRESS INC 
44. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
45. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
46. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC 
47. HARTE-HANKS CABLE INC 
48. HOLDEN-DAY INC 
49. HOLIDAY THEATRES INC 
50. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
51. ILLUSTRATED WORLD ENCYCLOPDA 
52. INFLIGHT SERVICES INC 
53. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
54. KANSAS STATE NETWORK INC 
55. KNIGHT RIDDER 
56. LEE ENTERPRISES 
57. LIBERTY CORP 
58. LIN BROADCASTING 
59. LIPPINCOTT (J B) CO 
60. MACMILLAN INC 
61. MAPLE PRESS CO 
62. MCGRAW HILL 
63. MEDIA GENERAL  -CL A 
64. MEREDITH CORP 
65. METROMEDIA INC 
66. MID-AMERICA PUBLISHING CORP 
67. MULTIMEDIA 
68. NATIONAL LAMPOON INC  -OLD 
69. NELSON (THOMAS) INC 
70. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
71. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE INC 
72. NORTH AMERICAN PUBLISHING CO 
73. PANAX CORP 
74. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES  -CL B 
75. POST CORP 
76. PRENTICE-HALL INC 
77. RAHALL COMMUNICATIONS CORP 
78. RCA   
79. REEVES TELECOM CORP 
80. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
81. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
82. SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING 
83. SONDERLING BROADCASTING CORP 
84. SPEIDEL NEWSPAPERS INC 
85. STARR BROADCASTING GROUP INC 
86. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
87. SUNGROUP INC 
88. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
89. TCI 
90. TIME WARNER    
91. TIMES MIRROR 





Year Reported: 1975 (cont’d.) 
 
93. UA COLUMBIA CABLEVISION 
94. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
95. UNITED CABLE TELEVISION 
96. VISION CABLE COMMUN  -CL A 
97. WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC 
98. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
99. WASHINGTON POST 
100. WAVERLY INC 
101. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 
102. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS  -CL A 
103. WJDX INC 




Year Reported: 1970 
 
1. ACTON CORP  -OLD 
2. ADAMS RUSSELL 
3. ADDISON-WESLEY PUB  -CL B 
4. ALLYN & BACON INC 
5. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
6. AMERICAN TV & COMMUN  -CL A 
7. BANTAM BOOKS INC 
8. BARTELL MEDIA CORP 
9. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
10. BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC 
11. CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP 
12. CAPITAL CITIES 
13. CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC 
14. CBS 
15. CCH INC  -CL A 
16. CHILTON CO 
17. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
18. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC 
19. CINEMA 5 LTD 
20. CINERAMA INC 
21. COLLINS RADIO CO 
22. COMMUNICATIONS PROPERTIES 
23. CORDURA CORP 
24. COWLES COMMUNICATIONS 
25. COX CABLE COMMUNICATIONS INC 
26. COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD 
27. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
28. DOW JONES 
29. ESQUIRE INC 
30. FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC 
31. GANNETT 
32. GRAY TELEVISION 
33. GROLIER INC 
34. GROSS TELECASTING 
35. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
36. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
37. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC 
38. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO 
39. INFLIGHT SERVICES INC 
40. IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC 
41. KNIGHT RIDDER 
42. LEE ENTERPRISES 
43. LIN BROADCASTING 
44. MACMILLAN INC 
45. MCGRAW HILL 
46. MEDIA GENERAL  -CL A 
47. MEREDITH CORP 
48. METROMEDIA INC 
49. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
50. OUTLET CO 
51. POST CORP 
52. PRENTICE-HALL INC 
53. PUTNAMS (G P) SONS 
54. RCA   
55. REEVES TELECOM CORP 
56. RIDDER PUBLICATIONS INC 
57. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC 
58. SCHOLASTIC CORP 
59. SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING 
60. SFN COS INC 
61. SIMON & SCHUSTER 
62. SONDERLING BROADCASTING CORP 
63. STARR BROADCASTING GROUP INC 
64. STERLING COMMUNICATIONS INC 
65. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
66. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
67. TCI 
68. TIME WARNER    
69. TIMES MIRROR 
70. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
71. UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR 
72. WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC 
73. WALTER READE ORGANIZATN INC 
74. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
75. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 
76. WHDH CORP 




Year Reported: 1965 
 
1. ACTON CORP  -OLD 
2. ADAMS RUSSELL 
3. ADDISON-WESLEY PUB  -CL B 
4. ALLYN & BACON INC 
5. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
6. BARTELL MEDIA CORP 
7. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
8. BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC 
9. CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP 
10. CAPITAL CITIES 
11. CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC 
12. CBS 
13. CCH INC  -CL A 
14. CHILTON CO 
15. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
16. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC 
17. CINERAMA INC 
18. COLLINS RADIO CO 
19. COWLES COMMUNICATIONS 
20. COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD 
21. CURTIS PUBLISHING CO 
22. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
23. DOW JONES 
24. ESQUIRE INC 
25. FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC 
26. GOODWAY INC 
27. GROLIER INC 
28. GROSS TELECASTING 
29. H & B AMERICAN CORP 
30. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
31. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
32. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC 
33. IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC 
34. JUBILEE INDS INC 
35. LIN BROADCASTING 
36. MACMILLAN INC 
37. MCCALL CORP 
38. MCGRAW HILL 
39. MEDIA GENERAL  -CL A 
40. MEREDITH CORP 
41. METROMEDIA INC 
42. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
43. OUTLET CO 
44. PRENTICE-HALL INC 
45. RCA   
46. REEVES TELECOM CORP 
47. SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING 
48. SFN COS INC 
49. SIMON & SCHUSTER 
50. STERLING COMMUNICATIONS INC 
51. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
52. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
53. TCI 
54. TIME WARNER    
55. TIMES MIRROR 
56. TRANS-BEACON CORP 
57. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
58. UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR 
59. WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC 
60. WALTER READE ORGANIZATN INC 
61. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
62. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 
63. WHDH CORP 




Year Reported: 1960 
 
1. ALLYN & BACON INC 
2. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
3. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
4. CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP 
5. CAPITAL CITIES 
6. CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC 
7. CBS 
8. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
9. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC 
10. CINERAMA INC 
11. COLLINS RADIO CO 
12. COWLES COMMUNICATIONS 
13. CURTIS PUBLISHING CO 
14. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
15. ESQUIRE INC 
16. FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC 
17. GOODWAY INC 
18. GROLIER INC 
19. H & B AMERICAN CORP 
20. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
21. HARCOURT GENERAL INC 
22. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC 
23. IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC 
24. JUBILEE INDS INC 
25. MACMILLAN INC 
26. MCGRAW HILL 
27. MEREDITH CORP 
28. METROMEDIA INC 
29. NEW YORK TIMES CO  -CL A 
30. OUTLET CO 
31. PRENTICE-HALL INC 
32. RCA   
33. REEVES TELECOM CORP 
34. SFN COS INC 
35. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
36. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
37. TIME WARNER    
38. TIMES MIRROR 
39. TRANS-BEACON CORP 
40. UNITED ARTISTS ENT  -CL A 
41. UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR 
42. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
43. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 
44. WHDH CORP 
 
Year Reported: 1955 
1. ALLYN & BACON INC 
2. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
3. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
4. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
5. COLLINS RADIO CO 
6. CURTIS PUBLISHING CO 
7. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
8. GROLIER INC 
9. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
10. HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC 
11. MACMILLAN INC 
12. MCGRAW HILL 
13. MEREDITH CORP 
14. SFN COS INC 
15. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
16. TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
17. TIME WARNER    
18. TIMES MIRROR 
19. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 




Year Reported: 1950 
1. RCA   
2. TIME WARNER    
3. CURTIS PUBLISHING CO 
4. CBS 
5. AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
6. MACMILLAN INC 
7. CHRIS-CRAFT INDS 
8. MCGRAW HILL 
9. WESTERN PUBLISHING INC 
10. TIMES MIRROR 
11. MEREDITH CORP 
12. GROLIER INC 
13. WHDH CORP 
14. SFN COS INC 
15. BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC 
16. COLLINS RADIO CO 
17. DISNEY (WALT) CO 
18. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
19. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 


































































































































1950 12     
 
1979 97.7 18.2335   
1951 24     
 
1980 97.9 19.5935   
1952 39     
 
1981 98 22.2174   
1953 56.8     
 
1982 98 29   
1954 58.1     
 
1983 98 37.2   
1955 67.2 0.5   
 
1984 98 41.2   
1956 76 0.9   
 
1985 98 44.6   
1957 83 0.9   
 
1986 98 46.8   
1958 84.5 1.1   
 
1987 98 48.7   
1959 86 1.3   
 
1988 98.1 49.4   
1960 88 1.4   
 
1989 98.2 52.8   
1961 89 1.5   
 
1990 98.2 56.4 0.8 
1962 90 1.7   
 
1991 98.2 58.9 1.19 
1963 91.5 1.9   
 
1992 98.3 60.2 1.75 
1964 93 2.1   
 
1993 98.3 61.4 2.31 
1965 92 2.4   
 
1994 98.3 62.4 4.974 
1966 93 2.9   
 
1995 98.3 63.4 9.39 
1967 94 3.8   
 
1996 98.2 65.3 16.37 
1968 95 4.4   
 
1997 98.2 66.5 22.01 
1969 95 6.1   
 
1998 98.2 67.2 30.66 
1970 96 7.6   
 
1999 98.2 67.5 36.55 
1971 96 9.2   
 
2000 98.2 68 43.94 
1972 96 9.7   
 
2001 98.2 68 50.1 
1973 96 11.3   
 
2002 98.2 69.4 60.5 
1974 97 12.4   
 
2003 98.2 69.8 63.1 
1975 97.1 13.6642   
 
2004 98.2 68.1 66.26 
1976 97.4 14.8215   
 
2005 98.2 67.5 69.57 
1977 97.4 16.0503   
 
2006 98.2 72.4 70.57 
1978 97.6 17.0985   
 
2007 98.2 69.3 73.52 
1979 97.7 18.2335   
 
2008 98.2 61.6 75.77 
1980 97.9 19.5935   
 
















1950 0 293.7 
 
1980 0 2788.1 
1951 0 339.3 
 
1981 1 3126.8 
1952 0 358.3 
 
1982 1 3253.2 
1953 1 379.3 
 
1983 1 3534.6 
1954 1 380.4 
 
1984 1 3930.9 
1955 1 414.7 
 
1985 1 4217.5 
1956 1 437.4 
 
1986 1 4460.1 
1957 1 461.1 
 
1987 1 4736.4 
1958 1 467.2 
 
1988 1 5100.4 
1959 1 506.6 
 
1989 1 5482.1 
1960 1 526.4 
 
1990 1 5800.5 
1961 0 544.8 
 
1991 1 5992.1 
1962 0 585.7 
 
1992 1 6342.3 
1963 0 617.8 
 
1993 0 6667.4 
1964 0 663.6 
 
1994 0 7085.2 
1965 0 719.1 
 
1995 0 7414.7 
1966 0 787.7 
 
1996 0 7838.5 
1967 0 832.4 
 
1997 0 8332.4 
1968 0 909.8 
 
1998 0 8793.5 
1969 1 984.4 
 
1999 0 9353.5 
1970 1 1038.3 
 
2000 0 9951.5 
1971 1 1126.8 
 
2001 1 10286.2 
1972 1 1237.9 
 
2002 1 10642.3 
1973 1 1382.3 
 
2003 1 11142.2 
1974 1 1499.5 
 
2004 1 11853.3 
1975 1 1637.7 
 
2005 1 12623 
1976 1 1824.6 
 
2006 1 13377.2 
1977 0 2030.1 
 
2007 1 14028.7 
1978 0 2293.8 
 
2008 1 14369.1 
1979 0 2562.2 
 
2009 0 13939 
For “Regulatory Climate” a ‘1’ indicates the federal government was led by a Republican 
administration; a ‘0’ indicates the federal government was not led by a Republican administration. 

















Observations 60 59 54 20 60 60 
Mean 871.84 90.2 33.29 38.87 0.62 6616.69 
Median 524 97.7 22.21 36.55 1 5855 
Std. Deviation 577.64 17.84 27.58 29.45 0.49 3532.02 
Range 
Low 328.81 12 0.5 0.8 0 2006 
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